

IAC-D-75/10      Annual Report of Resistance Intelligence Committee  
(RIC) for Fiscal Year 1957-58 (8 Sept 1958)

ARMY, DOS and USAF review(s) completed.

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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

FOREIGN LANGUAGE REFERENCE MATERIALS

1. It has been proposed that it might be of material assistance to the IAC agencies and perhaps others if an inventory were made of available Foreign Language Reference Materials.

2. The objective of this inventory is twofold: (a) to determine by survey existing lexicographical resources in various languages and functional fields within each language; (b) to determine priorities on the basis of existing needs for the conduct of the survey.

3. Three appendices are attached hereto for the use of the IAC agencies and others in assigning priorities to languages, functional fields within each language, and the categories of lexicographical materials required for operational purposes.

a. Appendix A contains a list of languages organized under two groups: languages of the European-Soviet complex and Near East-Asian languages.

b. Appendix B contains the list of functional fields which may be applicable within each language.

c. Appendix C contains the categories of lexicographical materials which may be required.

4. The agencies are requested to indicate the following:

a. The languages in each language group in order of priority.

b. The functional fields in each language in order of priority.

c. The categories of lexicographical materials within each language and field that will best meet their needs in order of priority.

d. Any additions to a, b, and c.

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5. It is assumed that the existing resources in the languages of the Western European area are sufficiently adequate to be excluded from the inventory. The two broad areas in which the inventory could usefully be made are the languages of the European-Soviet complex and the Near East-Asian languages, the former for obvious strategic reasons, the latter because of the dearth of resources available to meet operational needs.

6. At the conclusion of the development of these terms of reference for an inventory CIA will undertake to conduct the inventory, reporting back to the agencies. At that time a meeting to be held among interested agencies to determine what, if any, additional lexical materials should be prepared, perhaps by external research contract.

Secretary

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# Appendix A

## Language Groups

### EUROPEAN-SOVIET GROUP

Russian  
Ukranian  
Byelorussian  
Polish  
Czech  
Slovak  
Bulgarian  
Rumanian  
Hungarian  
Other

### MIDDLE EAST-ASIAN GROUP

Chinese-Mandarin	Tibetan
Chinese-Cantonese	Urdu
Japanese	Hindi
Korean	Pashtu
Tagalog	Persian
Vietnamese	Arabic
Thai	Malay
Burmese	Turkish
Indonesian	Other
Mongolian	

# Appendix B

## Functional Fields

General	Technical
Military	Political
Army	Economic
Naval	Sociological and Cultural
Air	Other
Scientific	

# Appendix C

## Categories of Lexicographical Materials

Dictionary	Specialized Glossary
English-Foreign Language	English-Foreign Language
Foreign Language-English	Foreign Language-English
Both	Both
Grammar	Specialized Abbreviation List
	English-Foreign Language
	Foreign Language-English
	Both
	Other

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S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-D-65  
14 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE  
THE JOINT STAFF  
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: Actions to Improve Intelligence Coverage  
of Indochina

1. The Office of National Estimates has reviewed with the IAC representatives the intelligence deficiencies in NIE-35/2 on Indochina. These are transmitted in TAB A.

2. This is not the first such review accorded intelligence on Indochina. Following publication of NIE-35/1 in March of last year, the Agencies informally noted that estimate's deficiencies in intelligence. The representatives who produced the subject paper noted that steps taken informally by the Agencies as a result of reviewing NIE-35/1 were beginning to result in better coverage. In view of this, the IAC agencies' collection administrators have re-examined the measures suggested last year for improving intelligence on Indochina. The actions being taken by agreement of the action offices to meet the present deficiencies are set forth in TAB B.

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TAB A TO  
IAC-D-65  
S-E-C-R-E-T

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LIST OF INTELLIGENCE DEFICIENCIES REVEALED IN  
THE PREPARATION OF NIE-35/2 (INDOCHINA)

A. Viet Minh Developments (in order of priority)



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Where at all possible, however, the scope and firmness of U. S. estimates could be increased as a result of more reliable intelligence on:

- (1) The extent of consolidation of control over territories held or infiltrated by the Viet Minh; the political, economic, and police instruments of control; the extent to which the regime is welcome and supported; the degree of power, if any, enjoyed by non-Communist Party leadership.
- (2) The relations, if any, between the Viet Minh and Soviets; the existence, if any, of frictions between Peiping and Moscow concerning superior influence over the Viet Minh. The influence within the Viet Minh of French and other European Communist advisers.
- (3) The frictions, if any, which exist between the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists; the effect of traditional Chinese-Indochinese ill-feeling; the existence, if any of Viet Minh "nationalist," as distinguished from "Communist," aspirations; the displacing, if any, of indigenous leadership and influence by Chinese pressure of personalities.
- (4) The logistic capabilities of the Viet Minh alone.
- (5) The Viet Minh manpower situation.
- (6) The state of morale among the Viet Minh leadership and Army, and among the population within Viet Minh-controlled territory.

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- (7) The present role of Ho-Chi-Minh; the other important figures in the Viet Minh (backgrounds, responsibilities, etc.).

B. Chinese Communist Developments

A situation somewhat similar to that discussed above exists as far as Chinese Communist support of the Viet Minh is concerned.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the fragmentary nature of this intelligence and the difficulties involved in establishing its reliability seriously weaken its usefulness. Where at all possible, U. S. estimates would profit from more reliable intelligence on:

- (1) Chinese Communist capabilities with respect to Indochina: logistic support of the Viet Minh from Communist Bloc sources, OB, transportation improvements, stockpiling, and air force and naval developments; economic capabilities for more active participation in Indochina.
- (2) Chinese Communist "volunteers," if any, with the Viet Minh; the number, method of integration, command relationships, training, status, function, and influence of these people.
- (3) Chinese Communist "advisors" with the Viet Minh; the number, training, status, function, and influence of these people.

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IAC-D-65  
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TAB B TO  
IAC-D-65  
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ACTIONS TO IMPROVE COVERAGE OF INDOCHINA

1. Chinese Language Publications -- the actions initiated as a result of the post-mortem on SE-27 (TAB A to IAC-D-57/1, 27 March 53) are tending to illuminate deficiencies on Chinese Communist developments.

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3. Requirements --

a. The State Department/IAD has undertaken the following:

- (1) a system of periodic guides for political and sociological reporting by the Embassy in Saigon.
- (2) a comprehensive economic reporting program guide for Saigon.

(3)

(4)

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b. The EIC and CIA/ORR have initiated actions as a result of the post-mortem on SE-27 (TAB B to IAC-D-57/1, 27 March 1953).

c. The military services

- (1) are continuing their review of standing collection requirements in the light of the stated deficiencies,  
[REDACTED]
- (2) will undertake a review of the priority intelligence targets for Indochina formulated by the Intelligence Priorities Committee of the IAC.

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4. Reporting -- The State Department is studying the organization of a Far East peripheral reporting system similar to that now existing in Europe, with possible posts at Tokyo, Saigon, Hanoi, Bangkok, Singapore, Djakarta and Rangoon. Such a system will expedite and augment exchange of information between posts in Southeast Asia. The Department will also explore the possibility of redefining the scope of pertinent Joint Weekas.

5. Liaison --

a.

[Redacted]

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b. The military services will ensure that area Tripartite Conferences are thoroughly explored for intelligence purposes.

c.

[Redacted]

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TAB B TO  
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14 April 1953

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IAC-D-67  
18 February 1953

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*Very interesting*

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS

1. Transmitted herewith is a copy of the report (Tab A) of the scientific panel convened as a result of the action taken by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 4 December (IAC-M-90, paragraph 3A) on this subject. Attached to the report are a summary of evidence presented (Tab B) and a list of the personnel participating (Tab C).
2. It is proposed to transmit copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Federal Civil Defense Administration; and the Chairman, National Security Resources Board for their information and such action as they may feel necessary.
3. The results of the panel's studies have moved CIA to conclude that no National Security Council Intelligence Directive on this subject is warranted.
4. Please inform the undersigned by 25 February 1953 if you do not concur in the action and conclusions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3, above.

[Redacted]  
Secretary

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DECLASSIFIED PER SEC 3(A), EO 11652  
APPROVED FOR RELEASE [Redacted]  
DATE 6 October 1978

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ARCHIVAL RECORD  
PLEASE RETURN TO  
AGENCY ARCHIVES, [Redacted]

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IAC-D-67  
18 February 1953

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TAB A

REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC PANEL  
ON  
UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS

1. Pursuant to the request of the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, the undersigned Panel of Scientific Consultants has met to evaluate any possible threat to national security posed by Unidentified Flying Objects ("Flying Saucers"), and to make recommendations thereon. The Panel has received the evidence as presented by cognizant intelligence agencies, primarily the Air Technical Intelligence Center, and has reviewed a selection of the best documented incidents.

2. As a result of its considerations, the Panel concludes:

a. That the evidence presented on Unidentified Flying Objects shows no indication that these phenomena constitute a direct physical threat to national security.

We firmly believe that there is no residuum of cases which indicates phenomena which are attributable to foreign artifacts capable of hostile acts, and that there is no evidence that the phenomena indicate a need for the revision of current scientific concepts.

3. The Panel further concludes:

a. That the continued emphasis on the reporting of these phenomena does, in these parlous times, result in a threat to the orderly functioning of the protective organs of the body politic.

We cite as examples the clogging of channels of communication by irrelevant reports, the danger of being led by continued false alarms to ignore real

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indications of hostile action, and the cultivation of a morbid national psychology in which skillful hostile propaganda could induce hysterical behavior and harmful distrust of duly constituted authority.

4. In order most effectively to strengthen the national facilities for the timely recognition and the appropriate handling of true indications of hostile action, and to minimize the concomitant dangers alluded to above, the Panel recommends:

a. That the national security agencies take immediate steps to strip the Unidentified Flying Objects of the special status they have been given and the aura of mystery they have unfortunately acquired;

b. That the national security agencies institute policies on intelligence, training, and public education designed to prepare the material defenses and the morale of the country to recognize most promptly and to react most effectively to true indications of hostile intent or action.

We suggest that these aims may be achieved by an integrated program designed to reassure the public of the total lack of evidence of inimical forces behind the phenomena, to train personnel to recognize and reject false indications quickly and effectively, and to strengthen regular channels for the evaluation of and prompt reaction to true indications of hostile measures.

S E C R E T

TAB B

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SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL ON  
UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS

14 - 17 January 1953

EVIDENCE PRESENTED

1. Seventy-five case histories of sightings 1951 - 1952 (selected by ATIC as those best documented).
- 25X1D 2. ATIC Status and Progress Reports of [ ] and Project BLUE BOOK (code names for ATIC study of subject).
- 25X1 [ ]
4. Summary Report of Sightings at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico.
- 25X1D 5. [ ]
- 25X1D 6. Outline of Investigation of U.F.O.'s Proposed by Kirtland Air Force Base [ ]
7. Motion Picture Films of sightings at Tremonton, Utah, 2 July 1952 and Great Falls, Montana, August 1950.
8. Summary Report of 89 selected cases of sightings of various categories (Formations, Blinking Lights, Hovering, etc.).
9. Draft of manual: "How to Make [ ] prepared a [ ]
10. Chart Showing Plot of Geographic Location of Unexplained Sightings in the United States during 1952.
11. Chart Showing Balloon Launching Sites in the United States.
12. Charts Showing Selected Actual Balloon Flight Paths and Relation to Reported Sightings.
13. Charts Showing Frequency of Reports of Sightings, 1948 - 1952.
14. Charts Showing Categories of Explanations of Sightings.
15. Kodachrome Transparencies of Polyethylene Film Balloons in Bright Sunlight Showing High Reflectivity.

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16. Motion picture of seagulls in bright sunlight showing high reflectivity.
17. Intelligence Reports Relating to U.S.S.R. Interest in U. S. Sightings.
18. Samples of Official USAF Reporting Forms and Copies of Pertinent Air Force, Army and Navy Orders Relating to Subject.
19. Sample Polyethylene "Pillow" Balloon (54 inches square).
20. "Variations in Radar Coverage", JANP 101 (Manual illustrating unusual operating characteristics of Service radar).
21. Miscellaneous official letters and foreign intelligence reports dealing with subject.
22. Copies of popular published works dealing with subject (articles in periodicals, newspaper clippings and books).

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IAC-D-68/1  
24 June 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

MEETINGS OF THE IAC  
(Clearances for Attending)

1. At the IAC meeting of 23 June 1953 it was suggested that the Committee review at its next meeting its procedure for clearances of individuals attending its meetings.

2. To assist in this review, there is circulated as TAB A a copy of the present procedure, dated 19 December 1951,

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IAC-D-68/1  
24 June 1953

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TAB A to  
IAC-D-68/1  
24 June 1953

19 December 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: IAC REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: Clearances for Individuals Attending  
Meetings of the IAC

Because of various uncertainties which have arisen in recent weeks regarding who is cleared for what material in an IAC meeting, the following procedures are suggested and, unless objections are heard, will be followed:

1. Each agency is responsible for ensuring that any individuals it brings to an IAC meeting are properly cleared for appropriate classifications of material.
2. Specifically, it will be assumed that all persons attending meetings of the IAC have been cleared for COMINT unless the Secretary has been informed to the contrary in a particular case. Individuals not having this clearance should normally be present only for the discussion of the item with which they are particularly concerned. It is also requested that whenever such an individual is present the agency responsible for him remind the meeting of the security limitations upon their discussions.
3. If Restricted Data is to be discussed an announcement should be made to that effect and the room cleared as necessary.

/s/

[Redacted Signature]

Secretary

Intelligence Advisory Committee

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TAB A to  
IAC-D-68/1  
24 June 1953

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IAC-D-68  
16 March 1953

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

MEETINGS OF THE IAC

1. Since October 1950 regular meetings of the IAC have been held on Thursdays (IAC-M-2 et seq.). Recent changes in the schedule of meetings of the National Security Council, as well as the elimination of the regular Friday briefing of the President, now make it desirable to consider rescheduling the regular meeting for Tuesdays.

2. In view of the above, and pursuant to paragraph 2 of DCID 1/1, the Director of Central Intelligence proposes to call the regular meetings of the IAC for Tuesdays at 10:30, subject to the consideration of the IAC at the next meeting.

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IAC-D-68  
16 March 1953

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IAC-D-75/10  
8 September 1958

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Annual Report of Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC)  
for Fiscal Year 1957-58

The attached annual report of the Ad Hoc Resistance Intelligence Committee, which has been approved by the members of that Committee, will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting, for noting.



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August 11, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Annual Report of Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC)  
for Fiscal Year 1957/58

1. The RIC in reviewing the flow of resistance intelligence in fiscal year 1957/58 noted some drop in both the quantity and the quality of intelligence on resistance following the extraordinary flow of information touched off by the relaxation of controls and unrest within the Soviet bloc during 1956. Publication of NIE 10-58 on March 4, 1958 provided a useful basic study on resistance intelligence and estimate on resistance potential as of January 1958. Although an effort was made to estimate the potential under conditions of war the Committee feels that a future revision of NIE 10-58 should give greater emphasis to resistance potential under various conditions of modern warfare, general and local, inasmuch as wartime resistance is the crux of the problem.

The trend of the flow was downward during the year (with some exceptions in the Far East) but was far from sinking to the level of the Stalinist period. [REDACTED]

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In the USSR, as soon as the increased volume of reports on anti-regime questioning and ideological deviation stemming from the World Youth Festival (July-August 1957) subsided, the flow of resistance intelligence dropped to a low level. A continued decline was noted in Hungary during the last half of 1957, and the flow was negligible in 1958. In Poland, the volume fell in spring 1958 as labor incidents diminished. The quantity of resistance reportage on East Germany remained stable, although a one-sided emphasis on opposition to the regime, particularly in raw, unassimilated intelligence material, still tended to create the erroneous impression that the regime was in trouble. There has been no change in the meager flow of resistance intelligence on Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania.

In the Far East, the main source of resistance information was the Communist press; [REDACTED]  
In Communist China, the press source declined because of restrictions imposed on publication of statements by "rightists" and other dissenters.

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[REDACTED] a continuing flow of reports concerning resistance activity in Tibet, and the press provided some information concerning dissidence in other minority areas, particularly Sinkiang. In North Vietnam, information on dissidence, particularly among intellectuals, continued to be available in about the

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8 September 1958

same volume, mainly in the press; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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2. Brakes upon manifestation of dissidence and ideological non-conformity were applied with increasing vigor throughout the Sino-Soviet bloc during 1957/58, resulting in the excommunication of Tito and the execution of ex-Premier Nagy late in the period. By June 30 the remaining source of slight deviation was Poland, and even here controls over popular expression of dissidence were greater at the end of the period. The obvious tightening of controls throughout the bloc frustrated hopes engendered by the previous relaxation; this may have increased popular bitterness although evidence is lacking.

The increased expression in the USSR of dissatisfaction during 1957 seemed to fall off during 1958, and a greater effort was made to bring ideological nonconformists into line. Some unconfirmed reports of court sentences for erring intellectuals were received early in 1958; expulsions of students from schools are known to have occurred. The activities of Jehovah's Witnesses in the Carpathian Ukraine resulted in court sentences in 1957. The drive against revisionist views, however, while increasing in intensity in 1958, still relied primarily on persuasion rather than repression and chiefly affected intellectuals. Peasant dissatisfaction tended further to decrease under the impact of Khrushchev's agricultural programs.

In Eastern Europe signs of resistance tapered off sharply as a result of the continued post-revolt cleanup trials in Hungary and high-level purges in Rumania, East Germany, and Bulgaria, which deterred would-be dissenters. Gomulka's warning to workers that strikes would no longer be tolerated, plus realization that his regime was the best possible for Poland under present circumstances, served to contain overt manifestations of dissent there. Accelerated collectivization drives in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Albania demonstrated the confidence of the regimes in their ability to maintain widely unpopular programs with little risk. In East Germany, for the first time since 1953, there were indications that the people regarded the regime's internal security position as virtually invulnerable. At the end of the reporting period, however, the East German regime itself apparently became concerned at the fact that pressure on intellectuals had resulted in an increased flow of refugees from professional classes.

The extent of resistance in Western China (Tibet, Chinghai, Kansu and Sinkiang) probably increased slightly during the spring of 1958. There also were renewed outbreaks among Tibetan tribes; none has been

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IAC-D-75/10  
8 September 1958

comparable to those of March-July 1956, however. As a result of strict governmental controls and the rectification campaign, resistance potential has probably declined in the rest of Communist China. On the other hand, resentment over the reversal of the Government's "100 flowers" policy probably has increased the level of dissatisfaction throughout the country.

Resistance activity in North Korea apparently remained approximately at previous levels and was manifested chiefly in passive resistance and general dissatisfaction with the regime. In North Vietnam it probably declined in intensity during the year with no reported outbreaks comparable to those of 1956; there were occasional strikes and manifestations of revisionist attitudes in intellectual periodicals.

JOHN KEPPEL  
Department of State  
Acting Chairman, RIC

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23 September 1957

*73 Sept 1957*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Annual Report to the IAC by the Resistance Intelligence  
Sub-committee (RIC)

1. This routine annual report was drafted by the Chairman of the RIC on the basis of a canvass of resistance intelligence problems by members of the RIC in their respective agencies. In CIA, the undersigned obtained the views of DD/P and DD/I components. The finished draft of the report was circulated among the committee members, discussed by them in their respective agencies and finally approved.

2. In view of this RIC coordination we do not anticipate any disagreement by other Agencies.

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IAC-D-75/9

12 September 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Annual Report of Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC)

for Fiscal Year 1956-57

The attached annual report of the Ad Hoc Resistance Intelligence Committee, which has been approved by the members of that Committee, will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting, for noting.



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IAC-D-75/9

12 September 1957

Annual Report of Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC)

for Fiscal Year 1956-57

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The Committee noted that official disclosures and other overt sources have become in the past year an increasingly important source of resistance intelligence.

2. Resistance in the Soviet Bloc in 1956 erupted into violent forms, with a temporarily successful revolt in Hungary and outbreaks in Poland, where the seething continued under the Gomulka regime. In these countries as elsewhere in the Bloc the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party gave impetus to developments which elicited concern of the Communist regimes.

A low level of resistance continued in the USSR, where destalinization caused widespread ferment with increased expression of anti-regime sentiments. This ferment found expression also in other parts of the Soviet European Bloc. However, there has been no significant change in resistance activity in Rumania, Bulgaria, or Czechoslovakia. Strict control held down resistance activities in East Germany, where the resistance potential is considerable.

In the Far East the most notable resistance activities occurred in Tibet, where the Chinese are using troops to hold down

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12 September 1957

resistance and also have retarded the rate of communization. Resistance appears to have increased in both mainland China and in North Vietnam. The paucity of information on North Korea prevents a valid judgment regarding resistance there.

The pattern of resistance showed great qualitative variation between anti-Soviet, anti-regime, and anti-Communist. There was some evidence of an increase in resistance potential even where resistance activities were not prominent.

3. The RIC on April 9, 1957 approved a letter recommending to the IAC scheduling of a new NIE on resistance in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Initiation of this estimate, 10-57, to replace one of 1955 on the same subject, was approved subsequently by the IAC. The Resistance Intelligence Committee was designated as the interagency coordinating body on country studies entering into this estimate.

THOMAS B. LARSON  
Department of State  
Chairman, RIC

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IAC-D-75/8.1  
20 June 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Proposed Estimate on Resistance in Sino-Soviet Bloc

1. Pursuant to the instruction of the IAC (IAC-M-292, item 4)

25X1 [ ] Mr. Kent have consulted further on certain problems with respect to production of the proposed estimate on resistance in the Soviet Bloc (IAC-D-75/8, 19 April; Memorandum to IAC, 31 May). Assuming that the IAC approves the scheduling of such an estimate,

25X1 [ ] Mr. Kent recommend that this paper be produced under the following procedure:

a. Office of National Estimates, CIA, to draft and coordinate with the IAC agency representatives a terms of reference to cover both the estimate and the country studies.

b. Written contributions to be solicited from all appropriate parts of the intelligence community, including the clandestine services of CIA.

c. CIA to furnish the person or persons to draft the country studies.

d. The Resistance Intelligence Committee to act as the interagency coordinating committee on these draft country studies. Presumably the Chairman of RIC would chair these sessions. CIA (ONE) can underwrite reproduction and dissemination of drafts, if this seems desirable. The IAC should do no more than "note" the finished texts.

e. These country studies will be used by CIA (ONE) as a basis for the draft estimate. It will be handled as a regular NIE, including IAC clearance.

2. The question of the scheduling of a resistance estimate, and its production under the above procedure, will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting now scheduled for 25 June.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

31 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Proposal for an NIE on Resistance Intelligence

1. With respect to the proposal of the Ad Hoc Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC) for a new National Intelligence Estimate on resistance in the Sino-Soviet Bloc (IAC-D-75/8), the recommendations of the Board of National Estimates are as follows:

a. "In principle, we believe that separate estimates on resistance, covering the entire Sino-Soviet Bloc, are not justified. The subject is properly treated only in the context of an analysis of the political-economic situation as a whole. In the present case, however, in view of the new appreciation of the nature and extent of resistance potential we have derived from developments over the last year, we recommend that an estimate be undertaken.


b. "We agree with the RIC proposal that this estimate should take the form of its predecessor--a short general estimate, followed by country annexes coordinated at the working level and noted by the IAC. In contrast to the previous procedure, we recommend that contributions from interested agencies should be made to the RIC, which should then present coordinated country studies to O/NE along the lines of the annexes to NIE 10-55. These would constitute drafts of the country annexes, and form the basis for the overall estimate. Terms of reference would be drafted by O/NE, taking account of RIC advice."

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2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting now scheduled for 4 June for appropriate action.

25X1A



*for* WILLIAM P. BUNDY  
Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

- 2 -

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Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

IAC-D-75/8  
19 April 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Recommendation for a National Intelligence Estimate on  
Resistance in the Sino-Soviet Bloc

The attached memorandum from the Resistance Intelligence Committee will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for appropriate action with respect to the Committee's recommendation.



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IAC-D-75/8  
19 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Recommendation for a National Intelligence  
Estimate on Resistance in the Sino-Soviet Bloc

1. In light of the major developments of significance to resistance potential in Communist countries, the Resistance Intelligence Committee recommends that the IAC direct the preparation of a revised National Intelligence Estimate on anti-Communist resistance potential in the Sino-Soviet bloc. The RIC recommends that this NIE be initiated in the fourth quarter of 1957 and that it be produced, like the previous NIE on resistance (NIE 10-55), in two parts: a general evaluation of the bloc-wide situation, and, as appendices, a series of separate statements for each country in the Sino-Soviet bloc which the IAC would simply take note of and whose coordination would be left to the working-level group.

2. In submitting this proposal the RIC has taken into consideration the IAC's decision with regard to the previous recommendation of the RIC on August 7, 1956 for an NIE on resistance. The RIC considers that NIE 12-57, while it touches on the resistance situation in Eastern Europe, provides too generalized a treatment to meet the specific needs of the intelligence community for agreed conclusions on resistance in the Sino-Soviet bloc.

BORIS H. KLOSSON  
Department of State  
Chairman, RIC

April 9, 1957

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

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*File*  
*LAC* *D* *7/8.1*

10 June 1957

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant, Intelligence,  
Department of State**

**SUBJECT: The Resistance Estimate and Country  
Annexes**

1. General Schow has informed me that he has an urgent requirement for coordinated -- though not necessarily IAC approved -- country studies on resistance. The Director of Central Intelligence agrees that such studies should be done.

2. It is my belief that the IAC is unanimous in desiring an estimate on resistance in the Bloc similar to NIE 10-55: "Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc" (12 April 1955).

3. The following compromise solution suggests itself as the most effective and equitable division of labor:

A. My office to draft and coordinate with the IAC agency representatives a terms of reference to cover both the estimate and the country studies noted above.

B. Written contributions to be solicited from all appropriate parts of the intelligence community. Including the clandestine services of this agency.

C. CIA to furnish the person or persons to draft the country studies.

D. The RIC to act as the inter-agency coordinating committee on these draft country studies. Presumably the Chairman of RIC would chair these sessions. My office can underwrite reproduction and dissemination of drafts, if this seems desirable. General Schow does not require full formal IAC action and I will strongly urge that the IAC do no more than "note" the finished texts.

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E. These country studies will be used by my office as a basis for the draft estimate. It will be handled as a regular NIE, including IAC clearance.

F. If the IAC feels that this procedure would unduly delay the appearance of the estimate, the estimate would not have to await the completion of the country studies but, as in the case of all other estimates, rest upon the contributions. Offhand, I believe that this is less desirable a procedure than the one suggested above for the reason that the RIC coordinating sessions will probably develop new and pertinent information not included in the contributions.

**SHERMAN KENT**  
**Assistant Director**  
**National Estimates**

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Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

IAC-D-75/8  
19 April 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Recommendation for a National Intelligence Estimate on  
Resistance in the Sino-Soviet Bloc

The attached memorandum from the Resistance Intelligence Committee will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for appropriate action with respect to the Committee's recommendation.

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Secretary

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IAC-D-75/8  
19 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Recommendation for a National Intelligence  
Estimate on Resistance in the Sino-Soviet Bloc

1. In light of the major developments of significance to resistance potential in Communist countries, the Resistance Intelligence Committee recommends that the IAC direct the preparation of a revised National Intelligence Estimate on anti-Communist resistance potential in the Sino-Soviet bloc. The RIC recommends that this NIE be initiated in the fourth quarter of 1957 and that it be produced, like the previous NIE on resistance (NIE 10-55), in two parts: a general evaluation of the bloc-wide situation, and, as appendices, a series of separate statements for each country in the Sino-Soviet bloc which the IAC would simply take note of and whose coordination would be left to the working-level group.

2. In submitting this proposal the RIC has taken into consideration the IAC's decision with regard to the previous recommendation of the RIC on August 7, 1956 for an NIE on resistance. The RIC considers that NIE 12-57, while it touches on the resistance situation in Eastern Europe, provides too generalized a treatment to meet the specific needs of the intelligence community for agreed conclusions on resistance in the Sino-Soviet bloc.

BORIS H. KLOSSON  
Department of State  
Chairman, RIC

April 9, 1957

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Classified by O/DCI  
6 August 1956  
6 Aug 56

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT : O/NE Comment on Recommendation of the  
Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC)

File  
Jae-D-75/7

1. In its Annual Report the RIC notes various Bloc developments (the riots in Poland and Georgia, student demonstrations in Prague, the changes in Satellite ruling circles, etc.) and recommends that the IAC:

"Agree that a continuation of this trend in the Sino-Soviet Bloc would warrant a revision of NIE 10-55 (Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc) in late 1956."

2. The Board of National Estimates agrees as to the importance of analyzing these trends but strongly believes that a revision of a narrow resistance estimate (which we would have to initiate shortly to complete in late 1956) is not the best way to handle this problem:

a. While many of the trends in the Satellites and USSR affect "resistance" potential, they are also far broader in their implications and can be more effectively dealt with in broad country and regional NIE's.

b. In particular the Satellite NIE now scheduled for January 1957 (which would thus overlap any new resistance

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
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estimate) will cover this aspect and be a better vehicle for so doing.

c. As was noted when the RIC was set up, the real need in this field is for detailed operational intelligence of a type which highly generalized national estimates are ill-suited to provide. The RIC itself was created largely to insure that this need would be met.

3. Recommendation: That the need for a revision of NIE 10-55 be kept under review by the RIC but that revision during 1956 does not appear necessary, especially since the new Satellite NIE will cover the most important aspects.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



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IAC-D-64/3  
20 January 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Index to IAC Documents Issued in 1955

1. Forwarded herewith for the convenience of the recipients of IAC documents (the IAC-D series) is a list of such documents issued during the calendar year 1955. The documents are listed in the order of their numbering, and not chronologically.

2. Questions concerning these documents may be referred  
25X1A to the Secretariat



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IAC-D-64/4

8 February 1957

**I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E**

Index to IAC Documents Issued in 1956

1. Forwarded herewith for the convenience of the recipients of IAC documents (the IAC-D series) is a list of such documents issued during the calendar year 1956. The documents are listed in the order of their numbering, and not chronologically.

2. Questions concerning these documents may be referred to the Secretariat  25X1A

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
IAC-D-64/5  
17 March 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Index to IAC Documents Issued in 1957

1. Forwarded herewith for the convenience of the recipients of IAC documents (the IAC-D series) is a list of such documents issued during the calendar year 1957. The documents are listed in the order of their numbering, and not chronologically.

2. Questions concerning these documents may be referred to the IAC Secretariat  25X1A



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ARCHIVAL RECORD  
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AGENCY ADDRESS

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IAC-D-69/2.1  
6 July 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

CONTROL OF OVERSEAS DISSEMINATION  
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953, subject as above, is approved.

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IAC-D-69/2.1  
6 July 1953

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

CONTROL OF OVERSEAS DISSEMINATION  
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Reference: IAC-D-69, 28 May 1953  
IAC-D-69/1, 9 June 1953

1. In order to allow for differing intra-agency procedures, the following revision of IAC-D-69/1 is circulated for concurrence:

a. In order to provide immediate knowledge in Washington of the location and extent of national intelligence filed in overseas installations, and in order to prevent its unnecessary overseas accumulation, each agency will maintain an inventory of such intelligence forwarded by it to its overseas installations.

b. Each agency will arrange for limitation on its overseas dissemination of national intelligence items (except NIS elements) to a period of one year or less, normally six months, depending upon the subject matter of the intelligence and the particular need of the overseas installation, at the end of which time the item will be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission requested of that agency to retain it.

c. When national intelligence (except NIS elements) is published, it will contain the printed statement:

"The overseas dissemination of this intelligence will be limited to a period of one year or less, at the end of which time it will be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission requested of that agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953."

d. CIA will control dissemination of national intelligence to foreign governments as required in (a) and (b) above.

e. CIA will insure that non-IAC overseas dissemination meets the requirements of (a) and (b) above.

IAC-D-69/2  
22 June 1953

25X1

2. Each agency agrees, without suspense date but by the earliest practical date, to apply the above requirements to national intelligence already disseminated overseas.

3. Please telephone or write your concurrences or non-concurrences to this Office, Attention [redacted] 25X1A  
25X1A [redacted] by the close of business, Wednesday, 1 July 1953.

[redacted] 25X1A

IAC-D-69/2  
22 June 1953

~~SECRET~~

IAC-D-69/1  
9 June 1953

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
CONTROL OF OVERSEAS DISSEMINATION  
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Reference: IAC-D-69, 28 May 1953

1. Representatives from the IAC agencies have met as requested in the referenced document and agreed as follows:

a. In order to provide immediate knowledge in Washington of the location and extent of national intelligence filed in overseas installations, and in order to prevent its unnecessary overseas accumulation, each agency will maintain in Washington an inventory of such intelligence forwarded by it to its overseas installations.

b. Each agency will indicate on each national intelligence item (except NIS elements) it disseminates overseas a period of one year or less, normally six months, depending upon the subject matter of the intelligence and the particular need of the overseas installation, at the end of which time the item will be destroyed, returned, or permission requested of the forwarding agency to retain it.

c. When national intelligence (except NIS elements) is published, it will contain the printed statement:

"In the case of overseas dissemination the forwarding agency will indicate on this intelligence a period of one year or less, at the end of which time it will be destroyed, returned to or permission requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/1, 9 June 1953."

d. CIA will control dissemination of national intelligence to foreign governments as required in (a) and (b) above.

IAC-D-69/1  
9 June 1953

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IAC-D-69  
28 May 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

CONTROL OF OVERSEAS DISSEMINATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The Director of Central Intelligence has been concerned with the security aspects of the IAC agencies sending national intelligence (which includes NIE's, SE's, NIS's and EIC's) to their overseas components. While it is realized that each agency protects this intelligence through its own security regulations, it is felt that some breach or violation of security with respect to national intelligence might be exceptionally hazardous to national security, especially if there is an accumulation of national intelligence materials concentrated at one point. Accordingly, CIA initiated informal conversations at the working level with representatives of State, Army, Navy and Air Force to ascertain current practice in the handling of these materials.

2. On the basis of these discussions, and in order to provide more adequate assurance to the DCI and IAC members in the control of national intelligence, CIA proposes that the IAC agree as follows: In order to provide immediate knowledge in Washington of the location and extent of national intelligence filed in overseas installations, and in order to prevent its unnecessary overseas accumulation, each agency will maintain in Washington an inventory of such intelligence forwarded by it to its overseas installations. Each agency will indicate on each national intelligence item it disseminates overseas a period of one year or less, normally six months, depending upon the subject matter of the intelligence and the particular need of the overseas installation, at the end of which time the item would be destroyed, returned, or permission requested of the forwarding agency to retain it.

3. It would be appreciated if representatives from the IAC agencies would meet with [redacted] of the CIA/Office of Intelligence Coordination on Monday, 8 June 1953, in Room 1128 M Building, to discuss this CIA proposal.

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[redacted] 25X1

IAC-D-69  
28 May 1953

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IAC-D-75/4

15 July 1954

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
INTELLIGENCE ON ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE  
AND RESISTANCE POTENTIAL

1. Reference is made to IAC-D-75/3 (originally circulated by the Chairman, Resistance Intelligence Committee, as the Report of the RIC, together with RIR-1, dated 29 June 1954).

2. Below are listed the amendments both to the Report of the RIC and to RIR-1, agreed to by the IAC at its meeting on 13 July. (See IAC-M-159).

a. Report of RIC: Paragraph II 1 c, page 2, change to read: "The continued joint production of detailed finished intelligence in the resistance field by a subcommittee of the IAC . . ."

b. Report of RIC: Paragraph 3, page 3, change final phrase to read "for approval for publication" instead of "for approval prior to publication."

c. RIR-1: Paragraph 3, page 4, and paragraph 25, page 21: In each paragraph change the first sentence to read: "There is no known recent contact between . . ."

d. RIR-1: Paragraph 5, page 5. Delete and substitute therefor paragraph 32, page 25, less last sentence.

3. In line with the G-2 suggestion for an ad hoc interagency working group and the ensuing discussion at the IAC on 13 July, it is recommended that the IAC, in addition to approving the Report of the RIC, direct that:

"An NIE on Anti-Communist Resistance in the Soviet Bloc shall be produced annually, it being understood that the terms of reference, the estimate itself, and the post mortem on the estimate will serve to provide:

a. adequate review of developments in the collection analysis, and dissemination of intelligence on resistance;

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IAC-D-75/4

15 July 1954


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IAC-D-75/4  
15 July 1954

- b. assessment of the adequacy of this intelligence to meet the requirements of IAC agencies; and
  - c. appropriate recommendations to assure continued full interagency coordination in the field of resistance intelligence."
4. The proposal in paragraph 3 above, as well as final action on the Report of the RIC and RIR-1, will be on the agenda of the IAC at its meeting at 10:45, Tuesday, 20 July.

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IAC-D-75/4  
15 July 1954

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Memo Regarding  
IAC-D-75/3  
15 July 1954

**INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

**Intelligence on Anti-Communist Resistance**  
**and Resistance Potential**

1. The Chairman, Resistance Intelligence Committee, circulated a memorandum dated 29 June 1954 which transmitted the Report of the Resistance Intelligence Committee, and RIR-1: Anti-Communist Resistance Activities and Potential in Poland, and Intelligence Relating Thereto.
2. It is requested that the number IAC-D-75/3 be assigned to the subject memorandum and its annexes.

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IAC-D-75/3

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

25X1

DATE: 10 December 1953

TO : Mr. Amory

25X1 FROM :

SUBJECT: Divergent Views Within CIA re Assignment of Responsibility for Intelligence Production on Anti-Communist Resistance

Tuesday morning, the IAC approved the recommendation (tabbed) in IAC-D-75/2, that an ad hoc subcommittee entitled Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC) with CIA as chairman and representation from all IAC agencies be established.

Attached for your and DCI decision are divergent views and recommendations of DD/P-AD/IC and AD/CI. The former recommend that OCI Chair the subcommittee and develop appraisals; the latter feels that DCI should assign these responsibilities to DD/P.

I have done nothing to try to resolve the split, feeling you would prefer to deal with it.

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3 December 1953

*Rec'd in O/DD 7 Dec.  
DD action prior to 8 Dec  
IAC meeting, not required.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Assignment of Responsibility in CIA  
for Intelligence Production on Anti-  
Communist Resistance and Resistance  
Potential

REFERENCE: IAC-D-75/2 (attached)

~~NO ENCLOSURE THIS COPY~~

Problem:

1. To assign to the appropriate CIA component the Agency's responsibility for intelligence production under proposed Resistance Intelligence Committee, as set forth in IAC-D-75/2.

Discussion:

2. As the referenced document indicates, Staff D ☐ of DD/P to meet its own needs took the initiative to produce an all-source intelligence study and supplement on satellite resistance. DD/P has stated that this function is not appropriately DD/P's and that it should look to the DD/I for the production of intelligence under Resistance Intelligence Committee.

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3. It is agreed between OCI and DD/P that, whoever has the responsibility, integration of such intelligence will have to be accomplished within the Special Center because of the need for all-source intelligence.

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Distribution:

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1 - DDI 2 - OIC  
1 - DDP

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4. In the interagency discussions it was recognized by all parties concerned that the program set forth in IAC-D-75/2 was one designed to obtain the maximum from the modest resources existing in the community through full coordination. All understand that no additional production resources are to be created for this effort.

5. OCI is of the view that it should not take the leadership for the following reasons:

a. Its charter does not require it to produce research studies of the type mentioned above unless so directed by the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. It does not have personnel qualified for this responsibility.

6. However, OCI states that it does identify indicators and trends in its normal current intelligence production and will continue to make available such materials for incorporation in any studies produced by a Resistance Intelligence Committee.

Recommendation:

7. That <sup>DD/P</sup>OCI be assigned the responsibility of Chairman of RIC, of contributing from its ~~current~~ intelligence take as useful to the program, and for developing with the other agencies appraisals on resistance and resistance potential from the materials assembled by RIC, it being understood that DD/P would be responsible for contributing intelligence information derived from clandestine operations as feasible.

Assistant Director  
Intelligence Coordination

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ (Non-Concurrence):

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Approved (~~Disapproved~~):

*as amended in  
para 1*

25X1A

15 Dec. 1953  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director of Central Intelligence

25X1

3 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH: Deputy Director (Intelligence)  
SUBJECT: Explanation for OCI Non-Concurrence  
and Alternative Recommendation

1. OCI does not concur in the recommendation of the foregoing paper because:

a) The research required to produce studies on resistance movements is for operational purposes and those familiar with operations should produce such studies as an operational support effort.

b) OCI lacks qualified personnel to assume this responsibility.

Recommendation:

2. That the DCI assign to DDP the responsibility of serving as Chairman of the Resistance Intelligence Committee and of developing with the other agencies appraisals on resistance and resistance potential from the materials assembled by RIC, it being understood that OCI will continue to contribute from current intelligence such materials as will be useful to such appraisals. It is of course understood that the present beachhead in the special center maintained by DDP would be available as a location for the integration of these materials.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ (Non-Concurrence):

25X1A

for Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

10 Dec. 1953

Approved (Disapproved):

HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON  
Assistant Director  
Current Intelligence

Approved (Disapproved):

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Director of Central Intelligence

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IAC-D-75/2

1 December 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

INTELLIGENCE ON ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE AND  
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL

1. The staff study attached as Tab A has been prepared by representatives of the IAC agencies, who were convened by CIA to consider a letter from G-2 to the Chairman of the IAC (Tab B).

2. It is proposed to discuss this matter at the IAC meeting on 8 December.

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IAC-D-75/2

1 December 1953

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TAB A

IAC-D-75/2

1 December 1953

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
INTELLIGENCE ON ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE AND  
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL

Problem:

1. To define the needs, capabilities and interagency arrangements for production of finished intelligence on the anti-Communist resistance and resistance potential of the Soviet Orbit.

Discussion:

2. Attached (Tab B) is a letter from G-2 to the Chairman of the IAC outlining the importance of this subject and the need for detailed intelligence on it as a basis for Army planning. Recognizing the desirability of utilizing the full resources of the IAC to meet this need adequately, G-2's letter recommends the establishment of an IAC ad hoc group to survey anti-Communist movements and resistance potential in the Soviet bloc and to prepare studies on current resistance trends, *during the report to be prepared by the first quarter of 1954.*

3. The clandestine service of CIA has for some time been of the opinion that there is a need for continuing systematic interagency study of all available materials on this subject. In fact, to meet its own needs (as well as for possible use by other agencies) the FI staff produced, on an all-source basis, a study, "Survey of Resistance Activity in the East European Satellites" (1 October 1951 to 1 March 1953) which was disseminated on an informal basis to the military services and the State Department. A supplement to this survey has also been disseminated.

4. Discussions with intelligence representatives of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, JIG and CIA have developed that all agencies have a pressing need for intelligence in this field to

IAC-D-75/2

1 December 1953

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TAB A

IAC-D-75/2

1 December 1953

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25X1A meet continuing demands for planning and operations. All agencies have modest production capabilities except JIG, which has none. All recognize that definite improvement would be possible through collaborative efforts in production. Insofar as national intelligence estimates are required, there already exists a procedure whereby any IAC agency may request the preparation of such estimates to meet their needs. It is believed that concerted guidance to collectors from overt sources (particularly levying of requirements on the [redacted] and peripheral reporting activities) would obtain considerable additional information. [redacted]

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Recommendations:

5. That the IAC establish an ad hoc subcommittee entitled Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC), with CIA as chairman and representation from all IAC agencies. It should coordinate the preparation, within the agencies' capabilities, of all-source intelligence studies and projections regarding trends, situations, and specialized phases of anti-Communist resistance and resistance potential in the Soviet Orbit (including Communist China) required by the participating agencies. The Committee will define the information requirements for this research and levy them as appropriate on the collectors. Upon the conclusion of a draft study or projection on any area, it will be reviewed by the Committee prior to dissemination to all the agencies for concurrence or comment before publication. Sanitized versions of all-source studies will also be issued.

6. That the Committee submit a report to the IAC within six months with recommendation for its discontinuance or continuance as a permanent committee.

7. That the Board of National Estimates take into consideration the relative priority of this subject in connection with the Board's review of the national intelligence objectives.

IAC-D-75/2

1 December 1953

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IAC-D-75/1 (Revised)  
24 November 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
INTELLIGENCE ON ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE AND  
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL

1. On Friday, 20 November 1953, IAC representatives reviewed the draft staff study on the above subject presented in IAC-D-75/1 (10 November). On the basis of that review there is submitted herewith for consideration a revised draft proposal incorporating proposed changes.

2. It would be appreciated if the interested parties would reconvene in Room 1128 M Building at 10:30 on Monday, 30 November 1953, to ready the proposal for IAC consideration.

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24 November 1953

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IAC-D-75/1 (Revised)

24 November 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

INTELLIGENCE ON ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE AND

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL

Problem:

1. To define the needs, capabilities and interagency arrangements for production of finished intelligence on the anti-Communist resistance and resistance potential of the Soviet Orbit.

Discussion:

2. Attached (Tab A) is a letter from G-2 to the Chairman of the IAC outlining the importance of this subject and the need for detailed intelligence on it as a basis for Army planning. Recognizing the desirability of utilizing the full resources of the IAC to meet this need adequately, G-2's letter recommends the establishment of an IAC ad hoc group to survey anti-Communist movements and resistance potential in the Soviet bloc and to prepare studies on current resistance trends during the first quarter of 1954.

3. The clandestine service of CIA has for some time been of the opinion that there is a need for continuing systematic inter-agency study of all available materials on this subject. In fact, to meet its own needs (as well as for possible use by other agencies) the FI staff produced, on an all-source basis, a study, "Survey of Resistance Activity in the East European Satellites" (1 October 1951 to 1 March 1953) which was disseminated on an informal basis to the military services and the State Department. A supplement to this survey has also been disseminated.

4. Discussions with intelligence representatives of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, JIG and CIA have developed that all agencies have a pressing need for intelligence in this field to

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24 November 1953

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IAC-D-75/1 (Revised)  
24 November 1953

meet continuing demands for planning and operations. All agencies have modest production capabilities except JIG, which has none. All recognize that definite improvement would be possible through collaborative efforts in production. Insofar as estimates are required, there already exists a procedure whereby any IAC agency may request the preparation of such estimates to meet their needs. It is believed that concerted guidance to collectors from overt sources, (particularly levying of requirements and peripheral reporting activities) would obtain considerable additional information.

Recommendations:

6. That the IAC establish a permanent subcommittee entitled Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC), with CIA as chairman and representation from all IAC agencies. It should prepare all-source intelligence studies on trends, situations, and specialized phases of anti-Communist resistance and resistance potential in the Soviet Orbit (including China) required by the participating agencies.

The Committee will define the requirements for this research and levy them as appropriate on the collectors. Upon the conclusion of a draft study on any area, it will be disseminated to all the agencies for concurrence or comment prior to publication. Sanitized versions of all-source studies will also be issued.

7. That the Board of National Estimates take into consideration the relative priority of this subject in connection with the Board's review of the national intelligence objectives.

IAC-D-75/1 (Revised)  
24 November 1953

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IAC-D-75/1

10 November 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

INTELLIGENCE ON ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE

AND RESISTANCE POTENTIAL

On Friday, 6 November 1953, IAC representatives listed below met in the office of the Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination to explore the G-2 proposal set forth in IAC-D-75. In pursuance of that meeting there has been prepared the attached draft proposal for consideration of the same representatives, who are invited to meet in Room 1128 M Building at 10:30 on Friday, 13 November 1953.

Mr. Boris H. Klosson	State	Lt. Col. J. T. Rutz	G-2
Col. Milton R. Knight, AFOIN	JIG	Col. E. S. Berry	G-2
Cmdr. Elvin C. Ogle, USN	JIG	Mr. H. S. Bennett	ONI
Mr. R. E. Adcock	G-2		CIA
Major E. C. Way	G-2		CIA

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10 November 1953

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IAC-D-75/1

10 November 1953

## INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

### INTELLIGENCE ON ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE

#### AND RESISTANCE POTENTIAL

#### Problem:

1. To define the needs, capabilities and interagency arrangements for production of finished intelligence on the anti-Communist resistance and resistance potential of the USSR and satellite countries.

#### Discussion:

2. Attached (Tab A) is a letter from G-2 to the Chairman of the IAC outlining the importance of this subject and the need for detailed intelligence on it as a basis for Army planning. Because of the desirability of utilizing the full resources of the IAC to meet this need adequately, G-2's letter recommends the establishment of an IAC ad hoc group to survey anti-Communist movements and resistance potential in the Soviet bloc and to prepare studies on current resistance trends during the first quarter of 1954.

3. The clandestine service of CIA has for some time been of the opinion that it has a need for continuing systematic interagency study of all available materials on this subject. In fact, to meet its own needs (as well as for possible use by other agencies) the FI staff produced, on an all-source basis, a study, "Survey of Resistance Activity in the East European Satellites" (1 October 1951 to 1 March 1953) which was disseminated on an informal basis to the military services and the State Department.

4. On 6 November 1953 the Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination/CIA convened agency representatives to discuss the needs and capabilities of the agencies in regard to this matter and to define what steps might be taken to meet the needs.

IAC-D-75/1

10 November 1953

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IAC-D-75/1

10 November 1953

5. The representatives have recognized that the Agencies' resources for strengthening intelligence production in this field are limited and that the importance of this subject does not warrant a high priority among the other competitive responsibilities now facing the community. Nevertheless, they felt that some collaborative effort in production and in providing guidance to collectors (particularly in levying requirements ☐ ☐ and peripheral reporting activities would probably provide considerable additional information.

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6. By and large, all of the agencies are interested in obtaining the results of production in this field. CIA and G-2 have pressing needs for it in order to develop planning.

7. Of the agencies, CIA and G-2 have a modest production capability, the State Department can provide some additional assistance, and the other agencies none.

8. It is believed that, within the limitations of resources, some improvement can be accomplished by IAC approval of the following recommendations:

Recommendations:

1. That CIA, in cooperation with G-2, be responsible for the initial production of detailed all-source intelligence studies on the anti-Communist resistance and resistance potential in the Soviet orbit/ ☐

2. That CIA and G-2 collaborate in defining the requirements for all agencies to levy on appropriate collectors.

3. That upon conclusion of a draft study on any area, CIA disseminate the paper to all interested agencies for review criticism and, when feasible, concurrence prior to publication and dissemination.

IAC-D-75/1

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IAC-D-75/1  
10 November 1953

4. That sanitized versions of all-source studies shall also be issued when practicable.

5. That the Board of National Estimates take into consideration the relative priority of resistance in connection with the Board's review of the NSCID-4 series of Intelligence Directives.

IAC-D-75/1  
10 November 1953

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant for Intelligence  
Department of State  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Department of the Army  
Director of Naval Intelligence  
Department of the Navy  
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,  
United States Air Force  
Director of Intelligence  
Atomic Energy Commission  
Deputy Director for Intelligence  
The Joint Staff  
Assistant to the Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Study of Anti-Communist Resistance and  
Resistance Potentials

1. Attached hereto is a copy of a letter to the Chairman, IAC, from G-2 suggesting that the IAC establish an ad hoc group to survey Anti-Communist resistance and resistance potentials in the Soviet Bloc. At CIA's suggestion, General Willems has agreed that it would be appropriate and helpful if a working level group of IAC representatives were convened to formulate recommendations for possible consideration of the IAC after a thorough examination of this problem.

2. Accordingly, it would be appreciated if you would designate a representative to meet with the Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination (Mr. Reber) in Room 1128 M Building on Friday 6 November 1953 at 10:30 a.m. to examine this problem. It is necessary that your representative be cleared for Special Intelligence and it would be helpful if he had already familiarized himself with a CIA study which has been made available to each agency on an informal basis, under the title "Survey of Resistance Activities in the Eastern European Satellites" dated 1 July 1953, and numbered [redacted]

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IAC-D-74/6  
8 September 1958

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Sixth Annual Progress Report to the IAC by the Scientific  
Estimates Committee

The attached progress report by the Scientific Estimates Committee  
will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting, for noting.



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
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2 SEP 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Sixth Annual Progress Report to the IAC of the  
Scientific Estimates Committee, Fiscal Year 1958

1. Transmitted herewith is the subject report which was approved by the Scientific Estimates Committee on 28 August 1958.
2. It is understood that the enclosed report will be disseminated to IAC members for noting at an early IAC meeting.



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Enclosure:  
(As stated)

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SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

18 August 1958

SIXTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT TO THE IAC OF THE  
SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE  
Fiscal Year 1958

I. AUTHORITY FOR THE SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

The Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC) was established on 14 August 1952 by Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 3/4, pursuant to the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 3 and the recommendation of the IAC Ad Hoc Committee to Survey Existing Arrangements Relating to Production of Scientific and Technical Intelligence (IAC-M-79, 14 August 1952).

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

The Permanent membership of the SEC consists of representatives from Central Intelligence Agency, The Joint Staff, the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The SEC has no permanent subcommittee structure. It employs ad hoc subcommittees, when needed, to review particular subjects under consideration.

III. GENERAL VIEW OF ADVANCES IN SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

The community made significant advances during the past year in almost every category of intelligence on sino-Soviet Bloc scientific and technological developments bearing upon the Soviet Union's military posture, economic strength, and international prestige.

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IV. RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

Pursuant to DCID 3/4, the SEC is charged with three responsibilities for the coordination of intelligence in scientific and technical fields.\* The accomplishments of the SEC under each of its responsibilities are summarized below:

A. The SEC shall "integrate scientific and technical intelligence, as and when required, for the production of national intelligence."

1. The SEC integrated scientific and technical intelligence contributions to seven national intelligence estimates (listed at TAB A). Major efforts in this connection were SEC contributions to NIE 11-4-57, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 1957-1962," SNIE 11-58, "Possible Soviet Long Range Bomber Development, 1958-1962," SNIE 11-7-58, "Strength and Composition of the Soviet Long-Range Bomber Force." The SEC also contributed judgments within its sphere of responsibility to NIE 11-5-58, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles,"

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In addition the SEC initiated revision of NIE 11-6-56, "Capabilities and Trends of Soviet Science and Technology," in view of intelligence developed since its publication in October 1956. As in the preparation of the previous estimate, the Committee plans to collaborate with JAEIC, GMIC and the Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC) with respect to areas of overlapping responsibility.


\*The atomic energy intelligence is assigned to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) by DCID 3/4; guided missile intelligence is assigned to the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) by Annex D to DCID 3/4, dated 31 January 1956.

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2. In fulfillment of its implicit responsibility continually to improve the scientific intelligence contribution to national intelligence, the SEC:

a. Revised priority objectives in scientific and technical intelligence in its sphere of responsibility in accordance with Priority National Intelligence Objectives (DCID 1/3). The revised statement, which will be published as an annex to DCID 1/3, continues to provide firm guidance for the collection and production of national scientific and technical intelligence in conformity with national security policy.



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f. Stimulated noteworthy advances in our knowledge of the nature and significance of the Soviet Union's great reliance upon science and technology as an instrument to increase its national strength. CIA, supporting in depth scientific intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, completed a series of monographs on significant facets of Soviet scientific and technological capabilities through 1967.

g. Heightened its interest in intelligence aspects of Soviet activities in the International Geophysical Year, especially with respect to Soviet capabilities for polar operations and Soviet geophysical research of military and economic significance. In this connection, CIA produced a series of briefs as a service of common concern.

h. Assisted member agencies in planning production of scientific and technical intelligence, minimizing duplication of research effort, and identifying possible gaps in coverage, through production of the Fifth "Annual Report of the Status of Scientific and Technical Intelligence Production Projects." This series covers on a world wide basis programmed internal and external research projects of member agencies in this field.

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B. The SEC shall "coordinate the production of Chapter VII of the NIS"

1. The SEC fulfilled its NIS commitment for Fiscal Year 1957 by coordinating the production of 21 Sections of Chapter VII, Scientific, and four Sections 17, Scientific, of Chapter I, Brief, and one contribution to an NIS Annual. A tabulation of these contributions is at TAB B.

2. The SEC prepared a consolidated schedule for production of NIS Chapter VII and NIS Section 17 during Fiscal Year 1959. This detailed schedule establishes the timing of each step for the fulfillment of the Committee's NIS commitments during the current fiscal year.

3. In accordance with established procedure, the SEC prepared, with NIS Committee approval, a detailed program for the production of NIS Chapter VII through Fiscal Year 1962. These four-year projections of production programming enable optimum collection in response to specific collection requirements and provide time for necessary research.

C. The SEC shall "stimulate and guide interagency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate."

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*Amended by  
USIB, 23 Sept 1958  
(USIB-M-2)*

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V. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The future nature of the SEC, or its successor, and the scope of its activities will depend on IAC action on the proposed DCID 3/2, "Production of Scientific Intelligence," which has been processed by the SEC.

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19 AUG 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Fifth Annual Progress Report to the IAC of the  
Scientific Estimates Committee

REFERENCE: IAC-D-74/5, 5 August 1957

1. This memorandum is for your information with respect to subject IAC agenda item on 20 August.

2. No problems were encountered in the preparation of the subject progress report, which represents complete agreement by SEC members.

3. Your attention is invited particularly to Part IV on page 5, in which the SEC proposes to undertake the production of certain interdepartmental intelligence.



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Enclosure:  
IAC-D-74/5

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IAC-D-74/5  
5 August 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Fifth Annual Progress Report to the IAC of the

Scientific Estimates Committee

Fiscal Year 1957

The attached Fifth Annual Progress Report of the Scientific Estimates Committee will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting, for noting.



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IAC-D-74/5  
5 August 1957

FIFTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT TO THE IAC OF THE  
SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE  
FISCAL YEAR 1957

I. Authority for the Scientific Estimates Committee

The Scientific Estimates Committee was established on 14 August 1952 by Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 3/4, pursuant to the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 3 and the recommendation of the IAC Ad Hoc Committee to Survey Existing Arrangements Relating to Production of Scientific and Technical Intelligence (IAC-M-79, 14 August 1952).

II. Organization of the Scientific Estimates Committee

The permanent membership of the SEC consists of representatives from Central Intelligence Agency, The Joint Staff, the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The SEC has no permanent subcommittee structure. It employs ad hoc subcommittees, when needed, to discuss or report upon particular subjects under consideration.

III. Responsibilities and Accomplishments of the Scientific Estimates Committee

Pursuant to DCID 3/4, the SEC is charged with three responsibilities for the coordination of intelligence in scientific and technical fields.\* The accomplishments of the SEC under each of its responsibilities are summarized below:

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\* Atomic energy intelligence is assigned to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) by DCID 3/4; guided missile intelligence is assigned to the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) by Annex D to DCID 3/4, dated 31 January 1956.

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IAC-D-74/5  
5 August 1957

A. The SEC shall "integrate scientific and technical intelligence as and when required, for the production of national intelligence."

1. The SEC integrated scientific and technical intelligence contributions to eight national intelligence estimates (listed at Tab A). A major effort in this connection was SEC production, in collaboration with the JAEIC, GMIC, and Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC) in their respective spheres of responsibility, of the first comprehensive community-wide study of capabilities and trends in Soviet science and technology, as the basis for a national intelligence estimate (NIE 11-6-56) on the subject. This joint study evaluates the Soviet scientific effort as a whole and the many facets thereof in relation to the total effort.

2. In addition, in fulfillment of its implicit responsibility to improve the scientific and technical intelligence contribution to national intelligence, the SEC:

a. Derived in collaboration with the JAEIC and GMIC in respective areas of responsibility a revision of the first community statement of priority objectives in scientific and technical intelligence from the over-all Priority National Intelligence Objectives (DCID 4/6). The revised statement, approved by the IAC on 5 March 1957 supersedes IAC-D-50/8, dated 10 January 1956 and continues to provide firm guidance for the collection and production of national scientific and technical intelligence in conformity with national security policy.

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IAC-D-74/5  
5 August 1957

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f. Provided assistance to member agencies in planning production of scientific and technical intelligence, minimizing duplication of research effort, and identifying possible gaps in coverage, through production of the fourth "Annual Report of the Status of Scientific and Technical Intelligence Production Projects." This series covers on a world-wide basis programmed internal and external research projects of member agencies in this field.

B. The SEC shall "coordinate the production of Chapter VII of the NIS."

1. The SEC fulfilled its NIS commitment for Fiscal Year 1957 by coordinating the production of 15 Sections of Chapter VII, Scientific, and seven Sections 17, Scientific, of Chapter I, Brief, of the NIS. A tabulation of these contributions is at Tab B.


2. The SEC prepared a consolidated schedule for production of NIS Chapter VII and NIS Section 17 during Fiscal Year 1958. This detailed schedule established the timing of each step for the

IAC-D-74/5  
5 August 1957

fulfillment of the Committee's NIS requirements during the current fiscal year.

3. The SEC prepared, with NIS Committee approval, a detailed program for the production of NIS Chapter VII through Fiscal Year 1961 on the basis of an agreed list of Sino-Soviet Bloc and non-Bloc areas which, in its opinion, require an assessment of the fundamental aspects of scientific research and development for national planning purposes. This advance programming enables optimum collection in response to specific collection requirements and provides time for necessary research.

- C. The SEC shall "stimulate and guide interagency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate."



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D. Other Responsibilities

1. In compliance with IAC directive, the SEC submitted to the IAC a statement of "Emergency Planning of the Scientific Estimates Committee." The paper presents the committee's concept of an SEC wartime plan of operation and provides a framework for more detailed planning to meet emergency situations under anticipated types of warfare.



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IAC-D-74/5  
5 August 1957

#### IV. Objectives for the Coming Year

In accordance with the provisions of DCID 3/4, the SEC will continue to work toward its principal objective of strengthening the over-all governmental intelligence structure for the production of scientific and technical intelligence. As new programs to improve its effectiveness, the SEC proposes:

- a. To produce detailed studies in scientific and technical fields as necessary to provide basic papers in support of national intelligence requirements.
- b. To publish in the format of SEC studies its contributions to certain national intelligence estimates where the committee feels that broader dissemination of the full discussion is warranted.
- c. To review periodically the intelligence progress made in fields on which the SEC has conducted substantive surveys.

30 July 1957

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
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IAC-D-74/4  
28 August 1956

**I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E**

**FOURTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT TO THE IAC OF THE**  
**SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE**  
**Fiscal Year 1956**

1. The attached progress report of the Scientific Estimates Committee, which was approved by the SEC on 16 August 1956, will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting, for noting.



**WILLIAM P. BUNDY**  
Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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IAC-D-74/4  
16 August 1956

FOURTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT TO THE IAC OF THE  
SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE  
Fiscal Year 1956

I. Authority for the Scientific Estimates Committee

The Scientific Estimates Committee was established on 14 August 1952 by DCID 3/4, pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 3 and the recommendation of the IAC Ad Hoc Committee to Survey Existing Arrangements Relating to Production of Scientific and Technical Intelligence (IAC-M-79, 14 August 1952).

II. Organization of the Scientific Estimates Committee

The permanent membership of the SEC consists of representatives from Central Intelligence Agency, The Joint Staff, the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The SEC has no permanent subcommittee structure. It employs ad hoc subcommittees, when needed, to discuss or report upon particular subjects under consideration.

III. Responsibilities and Accomplishments of the Scientific Estimates Committee

Pursuant to DCID 3/4, the SEC is charged with three responsibilities.\* The accomplishments of the SEC under each of its responsibilities are summarized below:

\* Atomic energy intelligence is assigned to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee by DCID 3/4; guided missile intelligence is assigned to the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee by IAC-D-81/14, Final.

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- A. The SEC shall "integrate scientific and technical intelligence as and when required, for the production of national intelligence."

1. The SEC integrated scientific and technical intelligence contributions to seven national intelligence estimates (listed at Tab A). In addition, in collaboration with the JAEIC, GMIC, and Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC), the SEC largely completed the first comprehensive community-wide study of capabilities and trends in Soviet science and technology as the basis for a national intelligence estimate (NIE 11-6-56) on the subject. This joint study evaluates the Soviet scientific effort as a whole and the many facets thereof in relation to the total effort.

2. In addition, in fulfillment of its implicit responsibility to improve the scientific and technical intelligence contribution to national intelligence, the SEC:


a. Derived in collaboration with the JAEIC priority objectives in scientific and technical intelligence from the over-all Priority National Intelligence Objectives (DCID 4/5). The statement, approved by the IAC on 10 January 1956 and issued as IAC-D-50/8, furnishes firm guidance for the collection and production of national scientific and technical intelligence in conformity with national security policy.

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i. Prepared the scientific and technical intelligence contribution, on matters within its purview, to the IAC Annual Report to the NSC on the Status of National Security Programs.

j. Provided assistance to member agencies in planning production of scientific and technical intelligence, minimizing duplication of research effort, and identifying possible gaps in coverage, through production of the third "Annual Report of the Status of Scientific and Technical Intelligence Production Projects" and a semi-annual supplement to the preceding annual report. These reports cover on a world-wide basis programmed internal and external research projects of member agencies in this field.

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
B. The SEC shall "coordinate the production of Chapter VII of the NIS"

1. The SEC overfulfilled its NIS commitment by coordinating the production of 21 Sections of Chapter VII, Scientific, and four Sections 17 of Chapter I, Brief, of the NIS. A tabulation of these contributions is at Tab B.

2. The SEC prepared, with NIS Committee approval, a detailed program for the production of NIS Chapter VII through Fiscal Year 1959 on the basis of an agreed list of Sino-Soviet Bloc and non-Bloc areas which, in its opinion, require an assessment of the fundamental aspects of scientific research and development for national planning purposes. This advance programming enables optimum collection in response to specific collection requirements and provides time for ensuing research.

C. The SEC shall "stimulate and guide interagency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate."

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IV. Objectives for the Coming Year

In accordance with DCID 3/4, the SEC will continue to work toward the principal objective of strengthening the over-all governmental intelligence structure for the production of scientific and technical intelligence. In pursuit of this objective, the SEC will make a concerted effort to:

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**A. Integrate scientific and technical intelligence for the production of national intelligence by:**


1. Producing SEC contributions to national intelligence estimates in which the scientific factor merits consideration.

2. Completing production of the first comprehensive community-wide study of capabilities and trends in Soviet science and technology as the basis for an NIE on the subject.

3. Conducting post-mortems of the scientific and technical portions of certain NIE's, particularly those which are revised periodically.


4. In addition, in fulfillment of its implicit responsibility to improve the scientific and technical intelligence contribution to national intelligence, the SEC proposes to:

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d. Initiate other detailed studies in scientific and technical fields as necessary to provide basic papers in support of national intelligence requirements.

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f. Review periodically the intelligence progress made in fields on which the SEC has conducted substantive surveys.

g. Provide assistance to member agencies in planning production of scientific and technical intelligence and in minimizing duplication of research effort. To this end the SEC will continue production of an annual report, with a semi-annual supplement, of the status of scientific and technical intelligence production projects in member agencies.



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**B. Coordinate the production of Chapter VII of the NIS by:**

1. Integrating contributions to NIS Chapter VII, Scientific, and NIS Section 17, Scientific, in accordance with the production program proposed by the SEC for Fiscal Year 1957 and approved by the NIS Committee.

2. Continuing to project NIS Chapter VII production programming three fiscal years into the future in order to provide ample time for collection activities in response to specific requirements and for ensuing research.

**C. Stimulate and guide interagency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate by:**

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2. Contributing to improved collection of scientific and technical intelligence information through coordinated requirements, intelligence advice, and guidance in certain fields of common concern to the community.

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IAC-D-74/3  
18 October 1955

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Third Annual Progress Report to the IAC

of the

Scientific Estimates Committee

September 1954 - August 1955

The Third Annual Progress Report to the IAC of the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC), circulated herewith for noting, will be placed on the agenda of an early meeting of the IAC.

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IAC-D-74/3

18 October 1955

Third Annual Progress Report to the IAC

of the Scientific Estimates Committee

September 1954 - August 1955

I. Authority for the Scientific Estimates Committee

The Scientific Estimates Committee was established on 14 August 1952 by DCID 3/4, pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 3 and the recommendation of the IAC Ad Hoc Committee to Survey Existing Arrangements Relating to Production of Scientific and Technical Intelligence (IAC-M-79), 14 August 1952).

II. Organization of the Scientific Estimates Committee

DCID 3/4 provides that the permanent membership of the SEC shall consist of representatives from CIA, The Joint Staff, the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force Force, and the Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC member has not participated in the activities of the SEC but has indicated that he would participate in the future in matters of direct interest to the AEC. (Note: Atomic energy intelligence was assigned to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee by DCID 3/4.)

The SEC has no permanent subcommittee structure; however, it employs ad hoc subcommittees, when needed, to discuss or report upon particular subjects under consideration.

III. Responsibilities and Accomplishments of the Scientific Estimates Committee

DCID 3/4 assigns the SEC three responsibilities, and in addition recommends "that the SEC concentrate on the integration of intelligence opinion (other than that for which JAEIC is responsible) as and when required for the purposes of national intelligence, and only incidentally assist in the coordination of production of other intelligence in scientific and technical fields."

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IAC-D-74/3

18 October 1955


The accomplishments of the SEC under each of its responsibilities are summarized below:

A. The SEC shall "integrate scientific and technical intelligence, as and when required, for the production of national intelligence"

1. The SEC integrated scientific and technical contributions to eight National Intelligence Estimates. A tabulation of these contributions is at Tab A.

2. In addition, in fulfillment of its implicit responsibility to improve the scientific and technical intelligence contribution to national intelligence, the SEC:

a. Initiated, in collaboration with the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee the establishment of national scientific and technical intelligence objectives in the light of the National Intelligence Objectives (DCID 4/4).



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18 October 1955



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f. Reviewed for the IAC, in compliance with IAC directive (Item 3, IAC-M-200), the proposed DCID 3/6, Establishment of a Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (IAC-D-81/9), and submitted its report to the IAC.



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h. Prepared the scientific and technical intelligence contribution to the IAC Annual Report to the NSC on the Status of Foreign Intelligence for the Period 1 July 1954 through 30 June 1955.

i. Provided assistance to member agencies in planning production of scientific and technical intelligence, minimizing duplication of research effort, and identifying possible gaps in coverage, through production of the second "Annual Report of the Status of Scientific and Technical Intelligence Production Projects" and a semi-annual supplement. This series of reports covers internal and external research projects of member agencies.

B. The SEC shall "coordinate the production of Chapter VII of the NIS"

1. The SEC coordinated the production of 20 Sections of Chapter VII, Scientific, and five Sections 17 of Chapter I, Brief, of the NIS. A tabulation of these contributions is at Tab B.

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IAC-D-74/3

18 October 1955

2. The SEC prepared a revised forecast of areas requiring scientific intelligence coverage in the NIS and proposed a two-year program (through Fiscal Year 1958) for production of NIS Chapter VII, which the NIS Committee approved. In addition, the SEC submitted for NIS Committee approval a tentative program for production of NIS Chapter VII in Fiscal Year 1959. The forecast, which was approved by the NIS Committee, permits more effective concentration of scientific and technical intelligence manpower on Sino-Soviet Bloc countries and provides for necessary coverage of non-Bloc countries of scientific and technical intelligence importance. The advanced programming provides time for collection in response to specific collection requirements and for ensuing research.

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IV. Objectives for the Coming Year

In accordance with DCID 3/4, the SEC will continue to work toward the principal objective of strengthening the over-all governmental intelligence structure for the production of scientific and technical intelligence. In pursuit of this objective, the SEC will make a concerted effort during the coming year to:

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Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

IAC-D-74/3

18 October 1955

A. Integrate scientific and technical intelligence for the production of national intelligence by:

1. Producing SEC contributions to National Intelligence Estimates in which the scientific factor merits consideration.

2. Conducting post-mortems of the scientific and technical portions of certain National Intelligence Estimates, particularly those which are revised periodically.


3. In addition, in fulfillment of its implicit responsibility to improve the scientific and technical intelligence contribution to national intelligence, the SEC proposes to:

a. Establish, in collaboration with the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, national scientific and technical intelligence objectives in the light of the National Intelligence Objectives (DCID 4/4).

b. Produce a comprehensive estimate of the development and utilization of science in the USSR.

c. Initiate detailed SEC studies in certain scientific and technical intelligence fields as necessary to provide basic papers in support of national intelligence requirements.

d. Conduct, both under IAC direction and at its own initiative, substantive surveys in various fields of scientific and technical intelligence for the purpose of identifying critical deficiencies related to consumer requirements and recommending means for their elimination.



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18 October 1955

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**B. Coordinate the production of Chapter VII of the NIS by:**

1. Integrating contributions to NIS Chapter VII, Scientific, and NIS Section 17, Scientific, in accordance with the production program proposed by the SEC for Fiscal Year 1956 and approved by the NIS Committee.

2. Continuing to program NIS Chapter VII production three years beyond the current fiscal year in order to provide ample time for collection activities in response to specific requirements and for ensuing research.

**C. Stimulate and guide interagency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate by:**

1. Providing assistance to member agencies in planning production of scientific and technical intelligence and in minimizing duplication of research effort, through continued production of an SEC annual report, with semi-annual supplements, of the status of scientific and technical intelligence production projects in member agencies and by other means.

2. Contributing to improved collection of scientific and technical intelligence information through coordinated requirements and guidance in certain fields of common concern to the community.

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3 November 1954


I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Second Annual Progress Report to the IAC

of the Scientific Estimates Committee

September 1953 - August 1954

The Second Annual Progress Report to the IAC of the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC), circulated herewith for noting, will be placed on the agenda of an early meeting of the IAC.



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3 November 1954

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3 November 1954

Second Annual Progress Report to the IAC  
of the Scientific Estimates Committee  
September 1953 - August 1954

I. AUTHORITY FOR THE SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

The Scientific Estimates Committee was established on 14 August 1952 by DCID 3/4, pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 3 and the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee to Survey Existing Arrangements Relating to Production of Scientific and Technical Intelligence. (IAC-M-79, 14 August 1952).

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

DCID 3/4 provides that the permanent membership of the SEC shall consist of representatives from CIA; the Joint Staff; the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC member has not participated in the activities of the SEC and has indicated that such participation would be limited to matters of direct interest to the AEC. (Note: Atomic energy intelligence was assigned to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee by DCID 3/4).

The SEC has no permanent subcommittee structure; however, it employs ad hoc subcommittees, when needed, to discuss or report upon particular subjects under consideration. Experience to date indicates no reason for changing the SEC organization and procedures.

III. RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

DCID 3/4 assigns the SEC three responsibilities, and in addition recommends "that the SEC concentrate on the integration of intelligence opinion (other than that for which JAEIC is responsible) as and when required for the purposes of national intelligence, and only incidentally assist in the coordination of production of other intelligence in scientific and technical fields."

IAC-D-74/2  
3 November 1954

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3 November 1954

The accomplishments of the SEC under each of its responsibilities are summarized below:

A. The SEC shall "integrate scientific and technical intelligence, as and when required, for the production of national intelligence."

1. The SEC integrated scientific and technical contributions to nine National Intelligence Estimates. A tabulation of these contributions is at Tab A.

B. The SEC shall "coordinate the production of Chapter VII of the NIS."

1. The SEC coordinated the production of 26 Sections of Chapter VII and one Section of Chapter I of the NIS. A tabulation of these contributions is at Tab B.

2. The SEC proposed a two-year program (through FY-1956) for production of NIS Chapter VII and NIS Section 17, which the NIS Committee tentatively approved. This advanced programming provides time for collection in response to specific collection requirements.

3. The SEC prepared for NIS Committee consideration, at the latter's request, a forecast of areas requiring scientific intelligence coverage in the NIS.

4. The SEC is reviewing the organization and coverage of NIS Chapter VII.

C. The SEC shall "stimulate and guide interagency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate."



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3 November 1954

2. The SEC agreed that detailed studies produced by member agencies in support of scientific and technical contributions to National Intelligence Estimates should be disseminated to SEC members. Member agencies have initiated such dissemination.


3. The SEC served as a liaison mechanism to coordinate requests for studies and briefings by member agencies.



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IV. OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

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E. The SEC agreed that a definite need exists for a study of "Development and Utilization of Science in the USSR," an uncompleted project of the former Scientific Intelligence Committee. The SEC will undertake the project at the earliest date permitted by the workload in member agencies.


F. The SEC produced its first "Annual Report of the Status of Scientific and Technical Intelligence Production Projects" and two quarterly supplements. The purpose of the report, which covers both internal and external research projects of member agencies on a worldwide basis, is to assist member agencies in planning production of scientific and technical intelligence and in reducing duplication of effort.

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3 November 1954

IAC-D-74/2  
3 November 1954

G. The SEC sponsored a series of twelve tours of CIA facilities and services for the production of scientific and technical intelligence.



#### V. OBJECTIVES FOR THE COMING YEAR

The SEC feels that sound progress was made during its second year of existence in improving the scope and quality of the scientific intelligence with which it concerned itself. In accordance with DCID 3/4, it will continue to concentrate its attention on the integration of intelligence opinion to improve the scientific and technical contributions to national intelligence. To accomplish this objective, the SEC will make a concerted effort during the coming year to:

A. Conduct, both under IAC direction and at its own initiative, substantive surveys in various fields of scientific and technical intelligence for the purpose of identifying critical deficiencies related to consumer requirements and recommending means for their elimination.

B. Conduct post-mortems of the scientific and technical portions of certain National Intelligence Estimates, particularly those which are revised periodically.

C. Undertake a comprehensive estimate of the development and utilization of science in the USSR.

D. Improve collection of scientific and technical intelligence information through appropriate guidance in certain fields of common concern to the community.

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IAC-D-74/2  
3 November 1954

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3 November 1954

E. Assist member agencies in planning production of scientific and technical intelligence and in reducing duplication of research effort through continued production of an SEC annual report, with quarterly supplements, of the status of scientific and technical intelligence production projects in member agencies.

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IAC-D-74/2

3 November 1954

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


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IAC-D-74/1

14 October 1953

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## INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

### FIRST ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

(Amended Page 4)

1. When subject report was noted by the IAC at its meeting on 13 October, the IAC agreed to the deletion of the last two sentences of paragraph V.A. as submitted (IAC-M-125, item 3).

2. Accordingly, there is attached hereto a revised page 4 to replace that included in the report circulated 30 September under IAC-D-74.



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IAC-D-74/1

14 October 1953

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(IAC-D-74/1)

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- c. The Development and Utilization of Science in the Soviet Union (This project will be reconsidered upon completion of two studies now under preparation by CIA/OSI [redacted] respectively, for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development.)

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#### V. OBJECTIVE FOR THE COMING YEAR

In accordance with DCID 3/4, the SEC will continue to concentrate its attention on the integration of intelligence opinion for the purpose of improving the scientific and technical contributions to national intelligence. To accomplish this objective, the SEC intends to:

A. Endeavor to make improvements in the present mechanism for integrating scientific and technical contributions to national estimates.

B. Conduct independent post-mortems of the scientific and technical portions of important national estimates, particularly those which are periodically revised as well as reviews of important sections of NIS Chapter VII.

-4-

Revised

14 October 1953  
(IAC-D-74/1)

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[REDACTED]

IAC-D-74

30 September 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

FIRST ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT OF THE  
SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

Subject progress report is attached for the information of the IAC members and comment as desired at an early IAC meeting.

[REDACTED]

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IAC-D-74

30 September 1953

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24 September 1953

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## FIRST ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT TO THE IAC OF THE SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

September 1952 - August 1953

### I. AUTHORITY FOR THE SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

The Scientific Estimates Committee was established on 14 August 1952 by DCID 3/4, pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 3 and the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee to Survey Existing Arrangements Relating to Production of Scientific and Technical Intelligence. (IAC-M-79, 14 August 1952).

### II. ORGANIZATION OF THE SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

DCID 3/4 provides that the permanent membership of the SEC shall consist of representatives from CIA; the Joint Staff; the Department of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC member has not participated in the activities of the SEC and has indicated that such participation would be limited to matters of direct interest to the AEC. (Note: Atomic energy intelligence was assigned to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee by DCID 3/4.)

The SEC has no subcommittee structure; however, ten ad hoc working groups were established during the past year.

### III. RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

DCID 3/4 assigns the SEC three responsibilities, and in addition recommends "that the SEC concentrate on the integration of intelligence opinion (other than that for which JAEIC is responsible) as and when required for the purposes of national intelligence, and only incidentally assist in the coordination of production of other intelligence in scientific and technical fields."

The accomplishments of the SEC under each of its responsibilities are summarized below:

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A. The SEC shall "integrate scientific and technical intelligence as and when required, for the production of national intelligence."

1. The SEC has integrated scientific and technical contributions to eleven National Intelligence Estimates and one Special Estimate. A tabulation of these contributions is at Tab A.

2. In the course of integrating the contributions to NIEs 65 and 90, three ad hoc working groups were established to resolve conflicting conclusions in the fields of electronics, guided missiles, and biological warfare. An additional ad hoc working group was established to prepare the initial draft of the SEC contribution to SE-38.

3. In addition to normal dissemination to the SEC members and to O/NE, detailed SEC contributions to NIE-65 and SE-38 were forwarded to technical organizations in the Department of Defense. (See Tab A.)

B. The SEC shall "coordinate the production of Chapter VII of the NIS."

1. The SEC has coordinated the production of twenty-nine sections of Chapter VII of the NIS, which are listed at Tab B. This total includes a backlog of fifteen sections from the FY-1952 program and fourteen sections of the FY-1953 program. The remaining seven sections of FY-1953 program (NIS-39, China) are scheduled for completion during October 1953. In the course of coordinating the production of Chapter VII, four ad hoc working groups were established to eliminate substantive differences in the drafts of some Sections of NIS-3, France, and NIS-15, Switzerland.

2. The SEC has proposed a three-year program (through FY-1956) for production of NIS Chapter VII which the NIS Committee has tentatively approved. This advanced programming will provide time for collection in response to specific collection requirements.

3. An additional ad hoc working group was established to review and recommend changes in the organization and coverage of Chapter VII. However, consideration of major changes has been deferred until completion of the survey to be conducted by the NIS Committee on user reaction to the NIS. The SEC has

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recommended a series of questions on Chapter VII for inclusion in the NIS Committee's questionnaire.

4. Responsibility for production of the various Sections of Chapter VII has been allocated among SEC agencies in conformity with the allocation of areas of primary production responsibility in DCID 3/4.

C. The SEC shall "stimulate and guide interagency liaison and such working level conferences as may be appropriate."

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2. The SEC has been used as a liaison mechanism to coordinate requests for studies and briefings by the member agencies.

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#### IV. OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

The SEC reviewed all uncompleted projects of the former Scientific Intelligence Committee and has taken the following action:

1. Completed and published on 10 February 1953, The Status of Soviet Development in the Field of Physics.

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2. Agreed to continue The Status of the Soviet Metallurgy Program on a periodic basis. The initial report, Soviet Activities and Potential in Powder Metallurgy was published on 27 July 1953.

3. Cancelled as joint projects the following:

- a. The Status of Soviet Chemical Warfare Program (This project was considered to be in the area of production responsibility of the Department of Defense.)
- b. The Status of Soviet Medical Research (This project was considered to be in the area of production responsibility of CIA.)
- c. The Development and Utilization of Science in the Soviet Union (This project will be reconsidered upon completion of two studies now under preparation by CIA/OSI [ ] respectively, for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development.)

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#### V. OBJECTIVE FOR THE COMING YEAR

In accordance with DCID 3/4, the SEC will continue to concentrate its attention on the integration of intelligence opinion for the purpose of improving the scientific and technical contributions to national intelligence. To accomplish this objective, the SEC intends to:

A. Endeavor to make improvements in the present mechanism for integrating scientific and technical contributions to national estimates. At present there is no provision for the receipt by the SEC secretariat of scientific and technical contributions prior to the date that all contributions are due in the Office of National Estimates. Thus, the SEC integration process must be carried out on "borrowed time."

B. Conduct independent post-mortems of the scientific and technical portions of important national estimates, particularly those which are periodically revised as well as reviews of important sections of NIS Chapter VII.

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C. Publish a periodic inventory of planned and completed scientific and technical intelligence production projects.

D. Conduct substantive surveys in various fields of scientific and technical intelligence for the purpose of identifying critical deficiencies and recommending means of eliminating them.

E. Make extensive use of appropriate specialists, particularly with regard to such important substantive deficiencies as may be revealed by the above post-mortems, reviews, or surveys.

F. Undertake a revision of the organization and scope of NIS, Chapter VII, if the need for revision is indicated by the results of the NIS Committee's survey of user reaction.

G. Make every effort to eliminate delays in the production of Chapter VII and to complete the annual program on schedule.

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IAC-D-70  
6 July 1953

## INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

### Proposed Survey of Alerting Procedures in Intelligence

1. NSCID No. 1 assigns specific responsibilities to the IAC and its member agencies in the event that information is received indicating impending foreign crisis situations or foreign conditions that affect the security of the United States to such an extent that immediate action or decision on the part of the President or the National Security Council seems to be required.

2. Although alerting procedures exist in each Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence desires that these procedures be reviewed as a whole periodically in order that the Director and the IAC may have maximum assurance of the effectiveness of procedures for handling emergency situations.

3. Accordingly, the DCI proposes that the IAC collaborate in a fact-finding survey on this subject. He has assigned responsibility to the Assistant Director, Current Intelligence, who has designated [ ] as the Intelligence Officer to conduct the survey. It is felt that to be effective this survey must begin at the point of receipt of incoming information and examine all steps in its routing. The survey would point up gaps in existing procedures should any gaps exist, and would bring together in one place the details of these procedures.

4. It would be appreciated if each member would inform the Secretary of his concurrence in this proposal and designate an officer who could be a point of contact for [ ] 25X1A

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IAC-D-70  
6 July 1953

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IAC-D-75/7  
12 July 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Annual Report of Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC)

For Fiscal Year 1955-1956

Attached is the Annual Report of the Resistance Intelligence Committee for Fiscal Year 1955-56, which will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for noting, and appropriate action with respect to the Committee's recommendation (para. 4).



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WILLIAM P. BUNDY  
Secretary

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Attachment to  
IAC-D-75/7  
12 July 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Annual Report of Resistance Intelligence  
Committee (RIC) for Fiscal Year 1955-56

1. Since its re-establishment in August 1955, the Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC) has:

- formulated its own terms of reference, which were approved by the IAC in January 1956.
- surveyed resistance activities in the Sino-Soviet bloc in 1955 on the basis of informal contributions from the Departments of State, Navy, Army, Air and the Central Intelligence Agency.
- fulfilled requests for information on resistance from USEUCOM and CINCFE.
- served as a forum for inter-agency discussions of current resistance developments in the Sino-Soviet bloc.

2. The RIC review of resistance developments during 1955 showed no material change in the quantity or quality of the flow of resistance intelligence from the bloc with the exception of some improvement with respect to East Germany and Communist China. There was little evidence of active resistance in 1955 in the Sino-Soviet bloc, although some passive resistance appears to have continued.

3. Since the Twentieth Party Congress in the USSR, the Soviet and satellite regimes have undertaken a number of measures ostensibly designed to liberalize their rule. These measures have apparently produced different reactions among different groups (the riots in Poland and Georgia, student demonstrations in Czechoslovakia, changes in top satellite ruling circles, etc). The RIC, working through the

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Attachment to  
IAC-D-75/7  
12 July 1956

component agencies, is watching the effects of these measures to see whether they tend to invite resistance or to lessen resistance. Thus far, the available evidence is too limited to justify a revision at this time of NIE 10-55, Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, April 12, 1955.

4. Recommendation. In conformity with its terms of reference, the RIC recommends that the IAC:

- (1) agree that a continuation of this trend in the Sino-Soviet bloc would warrant a revision of NIE 10-55 in late 1956.

BORIS H. KLOSSON  
Department of State  
Chairman, RIC

June 30, 1956

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Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

IAC-D-75/6  
17 January 1956  
Final

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Terms of Reference for the  
Resistance Intelligence Committee

Attached are the terms of reference for the Resistance  
Intelligence Committee as approved by the IAC on 17 January  
1956 (IAC-M-226, 17 January 1956, item 7).

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Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

IAC-D-75/6  
17 January 1956  
Final

## RESISTANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

### Terms of Reference

1. The Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC) of the IAC, established by the IAC on 30 August 1955 (IAC-M-210, 30 August 1955 and IAC-D-57/11, 30 August 1955), shall be composed of one member from each IAC agency which wishes to participate. Alternates may be designated.
2. The Department of State member shall be chairman.
3. The purpose of the RIC shall be to review the status of collection, analysis, and dissemination of detailed resistance intelligence regarding the Sino-Soviet Bloc in order to discover deficiencies and recommend action to overcome them.
4. The RIC shall request the IAC agencies to report twice yearly whether they have any information which would cause changes to be made in current IAC estimates (NIE 10-55, RIR-1, or RIR-2). The RIC shall advise the IAC when a revision of these estimates is considered necessary.
5. The RIC shall meet upon the request of any members to consider specific items of importance regarding resistance intelligence, to arrange for the production of coordinated reports, and to approve these reports before submission to the IAC for publication.

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IAC-D-75/6  
11 January 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Proposed Terms of Reference for the  
Resistance Intelligence Committee

1. The attached draft terms of reference has been prepared by the Resistance Intelligence Committee for IAC consideration pursuant to IAC-M-210, 30 August 1955, item 5.
2. This draft supersedes that circulated under IAC-D-75/5, 31 October 1955, which was rescinded on 14 November 1955. It will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 17 January 1956.

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IAC-D-75/6  
11 January 1956

## RESISTANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

### Proposed Terms of Reference

1. The Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC) of the IAC, established by the IAC on 30 August 1955 (IAC-M-210, 30 August 1955 and IAC-D-57/11, 30 August 1955), shall be composed of one member from each IAC agency which wishes to participate. Alternates may be designated.
2. The Department of State member shall be chairman.
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5. The RIC shall meet upon the request of any members to consider specific items of importance regarding resistance intelligence, to arrange for the production of coordinated reports, and to approve these reports before submission to the IAC for publication.

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Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

14 November 1955

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

**SUBJECT: Resistance Intelligence Committee Terms of Reference**

The Resistance Intelligence Committee terms of reference (IAC-D-75/5, 31 October 1955) are hereby rescinded at the request of the RIC. Revised terms of reference will be circulated at an early date.

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Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

IAC-D-75/5

31 October 1955

*Rescinded 14 Nov 55*

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Proposed Terms of Reference for the

Resistance Intelligence Committee

References: IAC-D-57/11, 30 August 1955  
IAC-M-210, 30 August 1955, Item 5

1. In accordance with IAC instructions, the Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC) has drafted the attached proposed terms of reference for IAC approval.

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of an early meeting of the IAC.

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Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

IAC-D-75/5  
31 October 1955

## RESISTANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

### Terms of Reference

1. The purpose of the Resistance Intelligence Committee of the IAC is to review the collection, analysis, and dissemination of detailed resistance intelligence regarding the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
2. The RIC will request the IAC agencies to report twice yearly whether they have any information which would cause changes to be made in current IAC estimates (NIE 10-55, RIR-1, or RIR-2). The RIC will advise the IAC when a revision of these estimates is considered necessary.
3. The RIC will meet upon the request of any members to consider specific items of importance regarding resistance intelligence and to arrange for the production of reports.

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5-2927

19 July 1954.

MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


SUBJECT: Resistance Intelligence Committee  
(for IAC meeting, 20 July)

*Re Doc D-75/4/3*

1. Two specific matters relating to RIC were held over from the 13 July meeting. So far as I can ascertain the agencies are now ready for quick action on both, along lines indicated below.


2. Nuclear-bombardment footnote to para. 35 in Polish Study (RIR-1):  
The original sole sponsors of this footnote (AFGIN) are now prepared to recommend deletion of the footnote and probably also of para. 35 (which has very little to say of a positive nature). The other agencies seem prepared to agree.

3. G-2 proposal for annual survey of resistance intelligence.  
The agencies, including G-2, seem prepared to accept the counter-proposal introduced by AD/NE at the 13 July IAC Meeting and circulated as IAC D-75/4, para. 3.



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Board of National Estimates



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5-7978

10035/A

19 July 1954


MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: RIR-1 (revision of para. 49).

1. I understand that the attached version of para. 49 represents your proposal for revision.

2. I recommend that the IAC be asked to instruct me to distribute this revised version to all recipients of the dittoed 23 June draft of RIR-1 for substitution in their copies.


3. Para. 49 is not included in that part of RIR-1 to be published in a new edition as an IAC-approved document.



Board of National Estimates

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Attachment



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20 July 1954.

RIR-1

Proposed revision of para. 49, to be distributed to all recipients of 23 June draft of RIR-1:

49. Intelligence on current Polish resistance is fragmentary. On many questions, it comes from estimates and deductions based upon general area knowledge, Communist publications,

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The lack of intelligence on resistance on any appreciable scale is probably attributable to the absence in fact of such resistance.

Noted by DD/H  
19 July 54  
Noted by DCI  
19 July 54

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Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

IAC-D-75/4

15 July 1954

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75/4

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
INTELLIGENCE ON ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE  
AND RESISTANCE POTENTIAL

1. Reference is made to IAC-D-75/3 (originally circulated by the Chairman, Resistance Intelligence Committee, as the Report of the RIC, together with RIR-1, dated 29 June 1954).

2. Below are listed the amendments both to the Report of the RIC and to RIR-1, agreed to by the IAC at its meeting on 13 July. (See IAC-M-159).

a. Report of RIC: Paragraph II 1 c, page 2, change to read: "The continued joint production of detailed finished intelligence in the resistance field by a subcommittee of the IAC . . ."

b. Report of RIC: Paragraph 3, page 3, change final phrase to read "for approval for publication" instead of "for approval prior to publication."

c. RIR-1: Paragraph 3, page 4, and paragraph 25, page 21: In each paragraph change the first sentence to read: "There is no known recent contact between . . ."

d. RIR-1: Paragraph 5, page 5. Delete and substitute therefor paragraph 32, page 25, less last sentence.

3. In line with the G-2 suggestion for an ad hoc interagency working group and the ensuing discussion at the IAC on 13 July, it is recommended that the IAC, in addition to approving the Report of the RIC, direct that:

"An NIE on Anti-Communist Resistance in the Soviet Bloc shall be produced annually, it being understood that the terms of reference, the estimate itself, and the post mortem on the estimate will serve to provide:

a. adequate review of developments in the collection analysis, and dissemination of intelligence on resistance;

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IAC-D-75/4

15 July 1954

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

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Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

IAC-D-75/4  
15 July 1954

- b. assessment of the adequacy of this intelligence to meet the requirements of IAC agencies; and
- c. appropriate recommendations to assure continued full interagency coordination in the field of resistance intelligence."

4. The proposal in paragraph 3 above, as well as final action on the Report of the RIC and RIR-1, will be on the agenda of the IAC at its meeting at 10:45, Tuesday, 20 July.



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IAC-D-75/4  
15 July 1954

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500060001-9

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RESISTANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

7 July 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Resistance Intelligence Committee

REFERENCES: (A) Report of RIC to IAC, with annex (RIC-16/3, dated 29 June 1954)

(B) IAC-D-75/2 (1 December 1953)

The following points are relevant to the IAC discussion of RIC on 13 July:

1. Resistance Study on Poland (RIR-1). One full-fledged study, RIR-1, is submitted as an annex to the RIC report. According to Reference B, such studies are to be submitted to the IAC agencies for approval prior to publication. The RIC expects, therefore, that the IAC members may prefer to indicate their approval or objections individually to RIC rather than to have a discussion and collective action on the paper at the IAC meeting.

The preparation and coordination of the paper were not marked by any major difficulty or controversy. The Air Force has taken a footnote at para. 35, believing that the effect of nuclear bombardment

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should be estimated. The other agencies held that no useful estimate could be made on that point, and the text reflects this consensus.

2. NIE on resistance in the Bloc. The predominant feeling in RIC is that the study next needed in the field of resistance estimates is the NIE on resistance in the Bloc as a whole, which is ~~tentatively~~ entered in the NIE program submitted for IAC approval. Most RIC members felt that NIE should be definitely laid on and that work on contributions to it should have priority over any other work on resistance estimates.

In addition to its basic function of appraising the bases, intensity, scope, and potential of resistance, the NIE is expected to serve two other useful purposes:

- (a) To indicate the character and urgency of need for subsequent more detailed one-country studies and for interagency surveillance of resistance developments.
- (b) To provide a sound all-source basis of judgment on resistance in view of the current publication and circulation of a series of unclassified reports prepared by the Legislative Reference Service for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which are believed to indicate conclusions at variance with prevailing informed views in the intelligence community.

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3. Agency views on continuation of RIC. The RIC was established (Reference B) in response to a desire of G-2 to explore the potentialities of fuller pooling of resistance intelligence, and in particular the fuller interagency dissemination and use of such intelligence as could appropriately be derived [REDACTED] 25X1

As a result of the RIC exercise, G-2 now appears fairly well satisfied that no large amount of useful resistance intelligence is being withheld from the community. G-2's primary interest is still in detailed current intelligence rather than broad estimative studies, and all three services would prefer to have RIC continued as a permanent interagency committee to insure that such information is periodically made available. However, they are not disposed to push hard for this, and are prepared to seek to meet their needs by direct approach to CIA and State, if no interagency machinery is available for the purpose. State and JIC are strongly opposed to continuation of RIC, holding that previously existing interagency machinery is adequate.

4. Recommended CIA position. The CIA representatives on the RIC recommend the following positions:

- (a) RIC report: that RIC accept the RIC report.
- (b) Role of CIA. Although CIA made an important contribution

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to RIR-1 and RIR-2, the agency does not require RIC-type resistance studies for its own operations. If G-2 requests this agency to produce periodic resistance surveys, CIA believes that under the present allocation of intelligence responsibilities set forth in NSCID-1, it cannot commit itself to the production of such studies for other agencies. If the IAC believes that such studies should be produced, NSCID-1 should be amended to allocate the responsibility for resistance intelligence specifically to one agency.

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Chairman  
Resistance Intelligence Committee

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## RESISTANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

29 June 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Report of Resistance Intelligence Committee

1. The attached Report has been approved by the RIC and is herewith submitted to the IAC.
2. Annexed thereto is RIR-12 Anti-Communist Resistance Activities and Potential in Poland, and Intelligence Relating Thereto, which has been approved by the RIC. Approval of IAC members is requested for RIC publication of this report in an abridged version comprising Parts I, II, and III.
3. Discussion of RIR is being placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting of 13 July.

[Redacted Signature Box]

Chairman  
Resistance Intelligence Committee

Distribution "A"

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## RESISTANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

29 June 1954

### REPORT OF THE RESISTANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

#### 1. COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

1. The Resistance Intelligence Committee was established by IAC approval (8 December 1953) of the recommendations set forth in IAC D-75/2 (1 December 1953).

2. The Committee consists of representatives of G-2, AFOSI, ONI, JIG, State, CIA, and FBI. CIA has provided a temporary one-man staff and the services of a chairman.

3. The Committee undertook detailed coordinated studies of anti-Communist resistance in two selected Bloc countries, Poland and China. These studies, based on agency contributions, covering the bases, strength and manifestations of resistance, the resistance potential under various assumed conditions, and all sources of raw and finished intelligence on resistance.

4. The study on Poland (RIR-1) has been approved by the Committee and is submitted with this report. The study on China (RIR-2) is now

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in the form of a staff draft not yet considered by the Committee.

5. The Committee was instructed to report "within six months with recommendation for its discontinuance or continuance as a permanent committee." (IAC D-75/2, para. 6). By memo to IAC members dated 21 May 1954, the Chairman requested an extension to 29 June for submission of this report.

## II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Committee has concluded the following from its activities:

- a. The Committee has provided a useful service in creating awareness of agency requirements and resources and in stimulating improvement in the resistance intelligence field.
- b. The breadth of the subject, the diversity of sources contributing thereto, and the constant requirements on each agency for intelligence in this field, all require effective coordination of collection, analysis, and dissemination of resistance intelligence.
- c. The continued joint production of detailed finished intelligence by a subcommittee of the IAC, however, is not in the interest of economy of effort and the agencies should continue to rely on the NIS and NIE machinery for such joint production.

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d. The direction and guidance of collection efforts, likewise, should continue to be exercised by individual agencies, each giving the fullest possible attention to the specific requests of the others.

2. The Committee recommends that Sections I, II, and III of RIR-1 be approved for publication as a Resistance Intelligence Committee report.

3. The Committee recommends that it be instructed to complete the coordination of RIR-2, with a view to its later submission to IAC members for approval prior to publication.

4. The Committee recommends that it be discontinued upon publication of RIR-1 and RIR-2, and that each of the IAC agencies continue, as appropriate, to stimulate collection, analysis and dissemination of resistance intelligence through the following means:

- a. Utilizing the terms of reference developed for RIR-1 and RIR-2 as fully as possible in the preparation of pertinent sections of NIS on Soviet Orbit countries and of agency contributions to the projected NIE on resistance.
- b. Utilizing these terms of reference as fully as possible in the preparation of collection guidances to field representatives.

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- c. Exploiting all available sources as fully as possible to increase the flow of information on resistance.
- d. Providing for full interagency interchange of field reports, individual agency studies, and external research reports on resistance and related subjects.
- e. Encouraging working-level liaison among analysts performing research on resistance.

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R E S I S T A N C E   I N T E L L I G E N C E   C O M M I T T E E

23 June 1954

RIR-1: ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES AND POTENTIAL IN POLAND,  
AND INTELLIGENCE RELATING THERETO

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

To appraise the basis, intensity, and distribution of disaffection and resistance in Poland, resistance potential under cold war and hot war conditions, and the sources of information on Polish resistance.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In estimating the resistance potential of a people in relation to their government, it is necessary to know the nature, extent, and depth of their discontent, the strength of their will to resist, and their capabilities for resistance compared to the regime's will and capability for controlling them.

In a Communist-ruled country the best-known of these factors is the regime's intention to preserve internal security regardless of cost; its capability of forestalling effective resistance; and its constant pressure to induce the individual to adjust himself to the Communist environment.

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Lacking any legal avenues for expressing dissent, the population still can indicate its discontent through a variety of actions and inactions unfavorable to the regime, ranging from individual acts of violence to widespread passive opposition. These types of resistance are symptomatic of discontent, but do not necessarily reveal the extent, constancy, and specific causes of underlying discontent. The will to resist, the skill in doing so, the motivation, and the opportunities, vary from element to element in the population, and from time to time. In this paper, the following terminology is used:

1. Dissidence is a state of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the regime.
2. Resistance is dissidence translated into action.
3. Resistance may be organized or unorganized, and in either case may be either active or passive.
  - a. Organized resistance is carried out by a group of individuals who have accepted a common purpose, agreed on leadership and worked out a communications system.
  - b. Unorganized resistance is carried out by individuals or loosely associated groups which may have been formed spontaneously for certain limited objectives without overall plan or strategy.

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- c. Active resistance is manifested by acts, usually involving violence, outside the framework of the resister's normal life and duties. It may express itself in actual attack, open defiance, destructive sabotage, or defection.
- d. Passive resistance is conducted within the framework of the resister's normal life and duties, and involves deliberate non-performance or mal-performance of acts which would directly or indirectly benefit the regime, or deliberate non-conformity with standards of conduct established by the regime.

CONCLUSIONS

1. There is evidence of widespread disaffection against the Communist regime in almost all social and economic groups in Poland. This disaffection is sharpened by the resentment of Russian domination. However, under the Communist control system, dissident Poles are unable to offer the kind of resistance that could threaten the security of the regime. Moreover, most Poles probably believe that the Communist regime can be eliminated only as a result of events outside of Poland.

2. While information on current resistance is fragmentary, it is almost certain that all major underground organizations

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disappeared by 1948. It is most unlikely that any new national network has sprung up. A few individuals or small independent bands in eastern and southwestern Poland engage from time to time in minor sabotage, hit-and-run raids and desultory propaganda action. Otherwise, opposition is generally expressed by the comparatively safe means of unorganized passive resistance. The persistence and possible further development of passive resistance will depend upon the extent and intensity of internal grievances as well as the Polish people's view of the power position and attitude of the Free World vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc.

3. There is no known contact between Polish emigre elements in the West and any resistance group in Poland. Moreover, Poles in Poland reportedly feel that the emigres are out of touch with them and neither know nor represent the true sentiment of the Polish people. It is unlikely therefore, that present emigre organizations will be able to play any substantial part in supporting or activating resistance in Poland.

4. Under cold war conditions, and as long as the Soviet power position in Europe remains essentially unchanged, the development of organized active resistance in Poland is highly unlikely. Such active resistance as now exists can be expected to decline still further. The precedent of Poland's fighting for independence against past

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suppressions is not now applicable because present Communist methods are far more efficient than those of the Czarist police or Nazi Gestapo. Thus the only significant resistance that can be expected is a continuation of unorganized, passive resistance.

5. In a state of war between the West and the Bloc resistance capabilities would be limited, at least initially, to sabotage and intelligence collection. Some Poles would be willing to work actively for liberation. The extent and effectiveness of their activities would depend upon the development of communications between local areas and Western forces in Europe.

#### DISCUSSION

##### I. BASIC FACTORS AND ELEMENTS OF DISSIDENCE

###### A. General Causes of Disaffection

1. Historical Background. Before the 19th century, resistance to foreign domination of Poland came largely from the Polish gentry. The bulk of the people, mostly peasants, had adapted themselves to foreign political rule, and their economic grievances remained the same no matter who controlled Poland. Neither Russia nor Prussia seriously disturbed the Polish Catholic Church until the latter part of the 19th century, when efforts were made to weaken its nationalistic influence by de-Polonization decrees banning the Polish language in Church services. It was only after famous Polish emigres in Paris

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had propagated a romanticized ideal of Polish independence that broad elements of the Polish people became imbued with a nationalistic spirit of resistance. The results were the uprisings of 1830 and 1863, followed by the rise of the industrial proletariat and the socialist labor unions. Because Russia then controlled the heart of Poland (the central and eastern provinces) which it governed more severely than Austria-Hungary or Prussia governed their Polish areas, and because the Czarist government made no real concessions to Polish national pride, anti-Russian sentiment became deeply ingrained in Polish nationalism. During World War II, hatred of the Germans was added to feeling against Russia, and large elements of the Polish population joined resistance movements against the tyranny of the German occupation.

2. Political basis of disaffection. Such widespread activity, together with Polish dislike of Russia, led later to the hope that the Soviet-controlled Polish Communist regime would also meet serious resistance. Next to hatred for the Germans, resentment against Russian domination is probably the most basic and general grievance in Poland today. Since the present regime is known to be the agent of the USSR and thoroughly infiltrated with Soviet personnel, anti-Russian and anti-Communist feelings are inter-mingled.

3. Economic basis of disaffection. The Polish people almost certainly feel that their economic plight, one of the chief sources of grievances, is largely due to Soviet exploitation. Among urban workers,

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the predominant economic complaints are low wages, shortages of consumer goods, long work hours, and rigid labor controls. Peasant disaffection stems largely from high taxes, high crop delivery quotas, and pressure to join collective farms. The grievances of both urban and rural workers are exacerbated by regimentation and rigorous police control.

4. Religious basis of disaffection. Another important cause of dissidence is the regime's persecution of the Church. The Roman Catholic Church, claiming about 96% of all Poles as members, has consistently opposed Communist government pressures whenever feasible. The regime has attempted to weaken the Church by hostile actions against the clergy, interference with the Church's financial resources, elimination of religious instruction in schools, censorship of the Church press, and curtailment of religious influence in hospitals. The regime has succeeded in this effect to the extent of making it difficult for the Church to serve as a focus of active resistance. However, the regime's anti-religious measures have not undermined religious faith except to some extent among the younger age groups where these measures are likely to have an increasing effect.

5. The intelligentsia's basis for disaffection. Disaffection among intellectuals, the higher bureaucracy, professional workers, some military officers, and the clergy, probably results less from

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economic considerations than from concern for national independence, civil liberties, cultural self-determination, and the preservation of Church institutions.

B. Major Dissident Elements

6. The peasantry. Most of the rural population, which comprises more than 60% of the Polish population, is strongly opposed to the Communist regime. The mass of medium and small landholders and the small and dwindling class of "kulaks" are nationalistic, religious, and individualistic. They resent state interference, collectivization and confiscatory delivery quotas. Many have been arrested or harrassed by tax and produce collectors. Many have been accused of sabotage, lost their civil rights, and been imprisoned. Peasants who were moved west to farm former German territory, fearing that they will lose the land to the Germans again, fail to build up derelict farm areas in the "recovered" regions. Benefits promised to the individual peasants by the regime's recent so-called "new course" may temporarily lessen the grievances of some peasants. In the long run, however, the regime's Sovietization policy will probably keep the peasants opposed to the present government. However, while the peasantry's capacity for passive resistance is quite high, its lack of leadership, organization and resistance materiel, and probably the constant scrutiny of security police informers, give it only a limited active resistance potential.

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7. Industrial workers, concentrated largely in urban areas, make up about one-fifth of the whole labor force (2.7 million out of 12.5 million total). In general, this group is dissatisfied with high work norms, low wages, substandard living conditions, forced attendance at political rallies and restrictions on the freedom to choose their place and type of work. This discontent is expressed in part through absenteeisms and non-fulfillment of production quotas. However, recent reports on industrial labor resistance indicate that resistance has been sporadic and unorganized. Close Communist surveillance of industrial workers in the plants and at home limits the opportunities for organizing major resistance activity among this group. Therefore, despite the considerable dissatisfaction and the conspiratorial traditions of the Polish workers, their considerable resistance potential cannot be realized under present circumstances.

8. The upper bureaucracy, the managerial class, and skilled technicians. Many in these groups support the regime, or at least do not oppose it, for reasons of ideological conviction or opportunism. Those who do feel hostile toward the regime conceal their feelings so as not to jeopardize their careers. Members of these groups enjoy superior social and economic positions, and even those who dislike the Communists probably consider themselves relatively well off.

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In view of their vested interests in the present order, these groups -- with few exceptions -- cannot be counted on to support organized resistance activities.

9. Office workers and service personnel in the middle and lower levels have little reason to favor the regime. In general, they share the hardships of the population at large and probably blame the Soviets and their Polish stooges for their troubles. Only those who owe their jobs to the regime may feel otherwise. It is difficult to estimate the resistance potential of this class because of the contradictory factors which bear on its opposition to the regime. However, this group might be particularly helpful to a non-Soviet occupying power committed to restoring Polish independence.

10. The intelligentsia. Creative artists, teachers, and scientists are in an ambivalent position. Most of them probably despise the policies of the regime and resent Russian cultural domination and the exclusion of Western cultural influences. On the other hand, the collaborating intelligentsia receives compensations in the form of social prestige and economic security. Following the Soviet example, all Communist regimes have striven to build up an intellectual elite whose members enjoy a highly favored position. While many of them undoubtedly have little respect for the regime or the principles it represents, prudence and opportunism probably cool their fervor for

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opposition. Only a minority of intellectuals -- mainly from among those rejected by the new order -- would make any contribution to resistance potential.

11. The clergy are overwhelmingly opposed to the regime. The few so-called "progressive" priests, whose careers have been furthered by the regime and who are committed to a break with Rome, constitute a minor exception. This relatively small group participates in the National Front Organization and leads in supporting the regime's attempts to strengthen its control over the Catholic hierarchy through press articles and propaganda meetings. The great majority of the clergy have remained faithful to Rome but have been intimidated by the regime and would in large part be prevented by police surveillance from contributing effectively to resistance, except possibly in time of war. Moreover, it is unlikely that the clergy will jeopardize its already precarious position by giving the regime an excuse to curtail church activities even further.

12. Military

(a) Officers: As a result of the regime's program of selection and training and the widespread assignment of Soviet officers to the Polish armed forces, the government apparently can count on the dependability of most high-ranking officers. Yet there are almost certainly still some older officers not really reconciled to Soviet-Communist domination. Recent defections demonstrate that even some

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younger officers resent the severity of Communist controls and Russification of Polish life and are not immune to the lures of the Free World. However, most officers probably consider that the regime is unlikely to be overthrown in the foreseeable future, and thus are resigned to getting along with it. Furthermore, under a different government, many of them probably would not have become officers, with all the privileges of that class, and in any case would hardly be permitted to remain officers if the regime collapsed. Whether the regime could depend on the officers as a whole in time of war is open to question. The Kremlin would probably hesitate to use them, especially those in the Air Force because of their greater opportunity for defection, for anything but defense and police purposes.

(b) Enlisted personnel: The majority of the enlisted men come from rural areas and are aware that difficult conditions in these areas result in large part from Communist policies. Nevertheless, Communist indoctrination has almost certainly taken hold in the minds of many conscriptees. Despite oppressive surveillance and an intricate informer system, however, it is likely that many enlisted men, given the opportunity to defect, would follow the example of Polish seamen who have jumped ship in Sweden, Denmark, and England. In time of war, reliability of enlisted men would be generally low except for enlisted members of the elite units such as the Internal Security Corps (KBN) and the Border Guard (WOP). Personnel for these security

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the Jews find life in Poland distasteful for historical, economic, political, and cultural reasons. Forbidden to emigrate, they eke out a precarious existence. Communist hostility toward Zionism exposes them constantly to reprisals. Having experienced persecution from both the Nazis and the Communists, and hoping above all to emigrate to Israel or elsewhere, the Jews in Poland are unlikely to prove an important factor in resistance.

15. Youth groups. The older members of youth groups show an opportunistic ability to conform for the sake of getting and keeping a job. A large part of this group is indifferent or unsympathetic toward the regime. The influence of parents, older workers, and teachers is probably still strong. On the other hand, some members of this age group have enjoyed better opportunities under the regime than they could have expected from a different government. Some of them may pass through a period of disillusionment or develop a cynical attitude toward the regime, but will probably continue to behave opportunistically. Younger youth and older children, more pliable and subject to indoctrination, are more likely to develop into willing instruments of the regime and as they mature, might become Communist robots. On the other hand, youth's natural resentment of authority and family traditions of nationalism tend to undermine the loyalty of at least a considerable segment of this group, and therefore give rise

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to certain resistance potential. There are indications that Polish youth as a group will not become a dependable tool of the regime for the time being.

C. Intensity of Resistance

16. Active resistance to the Polish regime virtually ceased by 1948 after the government had passed the Amnesty Act of 1947 and instituted very stringent internal security measures. After 1948, only a few individuals or small independent bands held out, notably in the forest areas of Eastern Poland and in various parts of Silesia. From time to time, they have engaged in minor sabotage, hit-and-run raids, or desultory propaganda action. Otherwise, opposition varies from element to element of the population but is generally expressed in comparatively safe measures of unorganized passive resistance (doing the least possible work, allowing state property to deteriorate, permitting the communication system to become inefficient, listening to anti-Soviet broadcasts, attending church services, etc.) Whispering campaigns are still rampant, despite threatened government reprisals.

17. The Poles have long been noted for their militant nationalism and their propensity for irrational and emotional political action. However, events since 1939 -- especially the ill-fated Warsaw uprising in 1944 -- have made the Poles who oppose the regime more cautious

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in the face of overwhelming odds. More recently, such developments as the quick suppression of the East German uprisings of June 1953 have shown that if Polish security forces cannot handle a revolt, Soviet troops will. Most Poles probably believe that they have no choice but to endure their plight until such time as a general war or other major international developments have weakened the Communist position.

18. Stalin's death has not significantly changed the outlook for resistance in Poland. The smooth succession in the Kremlin, once Beria was liquidated, did not weaken the Polish regime, and there is no indication that such deterioration is to be expected for the time being. Whether the "new course" will succeed in raising the level of living standards and thus alleviating disaffection remains to be seen.

## II. POLISH RESISTANCE SINCE WORLD WAR II

### A. History of Organized Resistance

19. Of the many Poles who fought the Germans between 1939 and 1945, about 100,000 refused to lay down their arms on VE day. Some refused because they considered Poland not yet free and others because they did not see how they could rehabilitate themselves under

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the new Communist order. Those who continued to resist owed their allegiance either to the AK (Home Army) or to the NSZ (National Armed Forces). Some wiser spirits among those who continued to resist concluded that a new organization was needed to preserve this anti-Russian resistance potential. They formed WiN (Freedom and Independence), and claimed to have established order and unity among the Poles willing to resist Russia. This organization is reported to have coordinated remnants of Polish World War II resistance organizations for the purpose of struggling against the Communist regime and gathering intelligence on behalf of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London. However, the KBW (Internal Security Corps) managed to break up this resistance movement into small groups which the "UBP" (secret political police of the Ministry of Public Security, UBP) infiltrated. The regime successfully followed three courses of action to neutralize this movement: (a) as a result of the 1947 Amnesty Act, the regime acquired the names of most of the resisters; (b) the recovered O.-2 (pre-1939 Polish military intelligence) files, with German intelligence annotations, pointed to possible resistance leaders; (c) extraction of the files from the London Polish Government-in-Exile revealed its grand resistance strategy against the USSR. This combined information enabled the Communist regime to liquidate Polish resistance by 1948. Nevertheless, the UB was able to "inform" the West in 1950 that a very powerful country-wide Polish resistance organization still existed. In the role of representatives of Polish

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resistance, they contacted Western powers and, in 1950, a working arrangement between the WiN leadership and the Western Powers was established. In December 1952, following a three-year effort to draw into this "resistance group" elements which were inclined to resist, the UB disposed of both the "WiN resistance" and the unreliable elements which were inclined to join it.

B. Current Organized Resistance

20. Information on existing resistance groups in Poland is fragmentary. It is almost certain that such organizations as WiN and MSZ have disappeared, and it is unlikely that any new national underground network has sprung up. However, there is evidence that some local resistance bands, particularly in the more inaccessible areas of eastern and southern Poland, have occasionally harassed the regime. Some of them are unquestionably criminals without political motivation. They seem to appear and disappear in rapid succession. There are also indications that conspiratorial student organizations in some large towns have committed occasional acts of vandalism against the regime and have surreptitiously spread anti-Communist propaganda. In general, the regime's constantly improved security organization has repeatedly subjected the underground to penetrations and attrition, and has forced the remnants into virtually complete

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inactivity. Increasing border controls have cut them off more and more from their Western contacts. Rigid application of the 1949 State Security Act has made it increasingly difficult for the remnants of resistance organizations to secure useful intelligence.

21. While a variety of organizations are reported to have been engaged in resistance activities in Poland, no reliable evidence exists to confirm such reports for the period since 1948. Although it is emphasized that little or no credence can be given to such information, a list of alleged resistance organizations is attached in Annex A.

C. Nature and Extent of Unorganized Resistance

22. The most extreme form of unorganized resistance is assassination of Communist functionaries by individuals or small groups. This occurs from time to time and is sometimes reported in the government press. An example is the occasional killing of Communist activists in rural districts by peasants resisting collectivization. Another active type of unorganized resistance is industrial or agricultural sabotage, such as the deliberate damaging of machinery or raw materials, or the neglect of livestock and crops on state or collective farms. Workers sometimes deliberately produce defective goods. Vandalism against state property by youth or other elements

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sometimes has political motivation. The same is true of the widely practiced embezzlement of funds of state enterprises, or diversion of goods and raw materials to private use, though economic necessity is often the primary motive of such practices.

23. A still more prevalent form of unorganized resistance is law evasion or simply non-cooperation with the regime on the part of individuals who feel able to get away with it. Peasants evade delivery of crop or livestock quotas, avoid paying taxes, engage in black marketing, and resist recruitment into collective farms. They sometimes hold down production by refusing to cultivate. Industrial workers restrict output both to escape fatigue and to express resentment of the regime's speed-up-system. They find ways of venting spite on other workers who cooperate with the system, and they resort to absenteeism when possible, though increasingly rigorous enforcement of work-discipline makes this difficult. Many elements of the population not only listen to Western, anti-Communist radio broadcasts but also flout the stern prohibition against disseminating to others the information so obtained. Teachers find ways of directing students to non-Communist knowledge and traditions, and of communicating in non-Communist terms with trusted non-Communist students. Religion constitutes a common meeting-place of tradition and belief where a majority of Poles can come together and express, at least tacitly, a determination not to be sovietized.

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24. The Poles probably consider that passive resistance is preferable to active resistance at present. They may believe that to keep alive a spirit of resistance surreptitiously, stimulated occasionally by local or individual acts of violence, will enable them not to forgive and forget, and may also serve as the foundation for organizing active resistance if the opportunity should arise. While the extent of unorganized and passive resistance or the damage it causes the regime cannot be determined, it is almost certain that many of the Polish people will continue to engage in such activities if there is little risk; and that the regime's program will continue to be impeded by such resistance despite the most stringent security measures.

D. Connections between Resistance and Emigre Groups

25. There is no known contact between Polish emigre elements in the West and any resistance group in Poland. Moreover, Poles in Poland reportedly feel that the emigres are out of touch with them and neither know nor represent the true sentiment of the Polish people. Even anti-Communists in Poland are believed to give little support to the idea of a future government composed of the present Polish emigres.

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E. Counter Measures of the Communist Regime

26. The Communist regime in Poland maintains an effective police-informant system. It is directed by the Ministry of Public Security (MBP), which, including its secret political police (UBP), has a personnel strength of 150,000. The Ministry also controls three other security organizations: (1) the Internal Security Corps (KEW), with a strength of 50,000; (2) the Border Protection Army (WOPO), with a strength of 25,000; and (3) the Citizens Militia (MO), with a strength of 100,000. The Citizens Militia is augmented by a voluntary police of some 150,000 called the Voluntary Reserve Citizens Militia (ORMO). These security forces, totalling 475,000, are assisted by a similarly large number of professional informers and about a million and a quarter Communist party members. Thus Poland has one informer or security officer for roughly every ten citizens.

27. The KEW liquidated all active organized resistance activity by 1948. The remnants of the resistance have been made entirely ineffective by UB penetration and provocation. The entire population is under the surveillance of the UB, the most dreaded organization in Poland, which discourages anti-regime activity but at the same time reinforces public sentiment against the regime.

28. Soviet advisors are placed in the Ministry of Public Security, both on a departmental level in Warsaw, and in provincial



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UB headquarters. Through these individuals and through Soviet-trained Polish officials in the MBP, the USSR is able to maintain control and assure the subervience of the security agencies. Ready for action in case of civil disorders are an estimated 41,000 Soviet Army troops and two MVD battalions. Soviet Army units in Poland consist of two line divisions, one tank and one mechanized; one anti-aircraft artillery division; group headquarters; and line of communication troops, including railroad and signal units. In addition, the Polish Armed Forces total 279,000 (Army, 250,000; Air Force 20,000; Navy 9,000). These would be available to quell widespread resistance activity, though their reliability for this purpose is uncertain. The effectiveness of the Polish security forces makes active resistance on more than a sporadic or local scale impossible in Poland today.

29. In addition to the security forces and informers, the regime uses other ingenious methods to discourage popular resistance. In the areas where partisans operate, the security forces have sometimes employed fake resistance bands or individual agents provocateurs. The regime also reportedly uses specially trained stooges in the bureaucracy and among professional people in attempts to incriminate opposition elements by organizing them into false resistance organizations. Another method of combatting resistance is to deprive the Poles of psychological support and hope by cutting them off from contact with

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the West. Another measure is to shift population groups in order to break up potential centers of resistance. Anti-resistance activities also include propaganda campaigns, efforts to indoctrinate the young, the playing up to Polish nationalism and, more recently, the announcement of an economic "new course" to improve living conditions.

III. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL

A. Under Cold War Conditions

30. As long as the Soviet power position in Europe remains essentially unchanged, the development of organized active resistance in Poland is unlikely. Such active resistance as now exists can be expected to decline still further. Local resistance by partisan bands, particularly in rural areas, will have little or no effect on the nation at large since it appears to be completely uncoordinated. The precedent of Poland's fighting for independence against past suppressions is not now applicable because present Communist methods are far more efficient than those of the Czarist police or Nazi Gestapo. The present total police state seeks to penetrate all families and to control the mind as well as the body. The Soviets cater to Polish nationalism by maintaining the fiction of an independent state, whereas Czarist Russia treated what is today Central and Eastern Poland

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as a mere province. The blows Poland received from Germany as well as from the USSR have probably blunted Polish faith in the possibility of liberation in the foreseeable future. Finally, it is to be expected that the Communists will take measures to prevent the Polish spirit from becoming again what it used to be: proud, aggressive, sensitive, and ready to fight against overwhelming odds.

31. The persistence and possible further development of passive resistance will depend upon the extent and intensity of internal grievances as well as the Polish people's view of the power position and attitude of the Free World vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc, and non-Communist moral support to the Polish people. For the time being, passive resistance will almost certainly remain unorganized.

B. Under Hot War Conditions

32. The existence of a state of war between the West and the Bloc would probably fire the imagination of most Poles sufficiently to make them willing to work again actively for liberation. Resistance capabilities, however, would at least initially be confined to isolated acts of sabotage and intelligence collection. It is unlikely that organized active resistance could be initiated unless and until Western successes had brought about a deterioration of the Polish state and security apparatus. Even then, caution would probably prevail until such time as a Western approach to Polish territory, increased Western aid to the resisters, and a breakdown of the Communist

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security system minimized the risk.

33. It is not likely that the highly efficient Polish underground of World War II will be duplicated; but individual resisters or small local groups could aid the non-Communist forces in such ways as helping Western escape and evasion operations, collecting intelligence, sabotaging Communist installations and communications, etc. The extent and effectiveness of such aid would depend upon the development of communications between local areas and Western forces in Europe.

34. Fear of Germany has traditionally played an important role in determining the attitudes of the Polish people. The Poles thus would be extremely apprehensive over the use of German forces in Polish territory, as well as over postwar territorial adjustments vis-a-vis Germany, and this factor might have a significant negative effect on the anti-Soviet resistance effort. However, this effect cannot be usefully measured at this time since it would depend on such presently unknown factors as the nature and degree of the German involvement, the announced war aims of the Western powers with respect to territorial settlements, and the overall military situation.

35. Western employment of nuclear weapons in Poland may have a significant psychological effect on the Polish people and may influence their attitude toward cooperation with the West in a resistance movement. An adequate basis on which to estimate the nature of the effect on resistance does not exist at this time; it would

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depend on such circumstances as the targets attacked, types of weapons used, and the military situation at the time.<sup>1</sup>

36. The question of responsibility for initiation of war would probably not significantly affect resistance activities.

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<sup>1</sup> AFOIN disagrees with the last sentence of paragraph 35 and expresses the following position:

Western employment of nuclear weapons in Poland may have a significant psychological effect on the Polish people and may influence their attitude toward cooperation with the West in a resistance movement. If atomic attacks were made on military targets such as air and naval bases or troop concentrations isolated from populated areas, the will to resist might be stiffened since such attacks might indicate to the Poles that the war of liberation had begun. Attacks on urban targets resulting in large civilian casualties might alienate many Poles from the West. However, such adverse reactions might be minimized if atomic attacks were limited to areas important to the Soviet war effort, and were accompanied by a coordinated psychological warfare campaign since most Poles believe that their country can be liberated only through the sacrifices of war. Furthermore, if the cities attacked are government control centers, the disruption of the internal security system resulting from the attacks could facilitate resistance activity.

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48. Printed Materials: They comprise newspapers, periodicals, books, and pamphlets distributed both inside and outside Poland. They contain from time to time statements shedding light in an indirect fashion — requiring reading "between the lines" — on disaffection and resistance, e.g., texts and laws aimed at controlling resistance or evasion, or exhortation to vigilance against "class enemies" of "unprogressive attitudes." Sometimes these sources admit the existence of resistance, e.g., news reports of the assassination of Communist officials; or statements of Party leaders admitting the occurrence of sabotage. Such printed materials have the advantage of currency as they reflect local conditions at the

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time of publication. They are useful in direct ratio to the skill used in their analysis. Some dissemination of translated material is made through CIA's FDD. At present, that finished intelligence which is based directly on original Polish language publications and specifically focussed on resistance trends is provided in the US Government only by OIR. CIA produces finished resistance intelligence based on Polish language material in translation.

VI. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

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IAC-D-75/2

Copy No. 2

1 December 1953

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## INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

INTELLIGENCE ON ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE AND  
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL

1. The staff study attached as Tab A has been prepared by representatives of the IAC agencies, who were convened by CIA to consider a letter from G-2 to the Chairman of the IAC (Tab B).

2. It is proposed to discuss this matter at the IAC meeting on 8 December.

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1 December 1953

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22 January 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

GUIDANCE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE  
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

1. Attached are copies of an interchange of correspondence on the above subject between the Deputy Chief of Staff, USAF, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. This correspondence is disseminated for the information of the IAC agencies and as background to a discussion of this project at an early IAC meeting.

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22 January 1953

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General Walter Bedell Smith

If the establishment of a more definite relationship between CIA and our intelligence development planning activity appears to you to be desirable, I might suggest that a possible mechanism would be the appointment of an appropriate CIA liaison officer to monitor the working relationships between our study effort and the CIA.

After you have had an opportunity to consider this subject, I would be most grateful for your ideas as to the specific steps that might be taken.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ L. C. Craigie

L. C. CRAIGIE  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Deputy Chief of Staff,  
Development

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C O P Y

IAC-D-63

22 January 1953

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington 25, D. C.

10 January 1953

Lt. General L. C. Craigie  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
United States Air Force  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Craigie:

In further response to your letter to me of December 3, a proposal has been developed which will marshal appropriate resources of the national intelligence community to render intelligence support for the various projects referred to in your letter.

In the course of discussion between your Colonel Leghorn and various members of my staff, it has become clear that the scope of those projects and the multiplicity of ways in which their success may contribute to the gathering and production of national intelligence far exceed the limits of responsibility of any single intelligence agency. Clearly the guidance you require must be comprehensive and inclusive of the moods and views of the entire intelligence community. It seems to me, therefore, that the direct liaison that you propose with this Agency, while desirable for certain aspects of your problem, will not satisfy your over-all needs.

You could, of course, establish similar bilateral arrangements with the other six intelligence organizations, but this would be burdensome, and would not, I believe, produce the same efficient coordination that is available through the existing machinery of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, of which I am Chairman, and its functional subcommittees. I therefore propose, with your concurrence, to raise this problem at an early meeting of the IAC and recommend that it authorize the creation of a special standing group to consider collectively projects which you forward for its consideration and in turn on its own initiative to keep you advised of the continuing and long range needs of intelligence to the extent these are pertinent to your work.

I shall suggest that this standing group be kept small in the interest of efficiency but that it be broadly representative of the full range of our interests. To this end, I would plan to designate the chairmen

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22 January 1953

respectively of our principal subcommittees, i.e., Economic, Scientific, Watch, Atomic Energy, and Clandestine Collection. Each of these for his functional field can furnish you with the views of all the IAC Agencies or can as the case may be put you in contact with the particular individual or organization that would be most apt to have the answer to specific requests you might make.

I am informed that Colonel Leghorn and Major General Samford are in accord with the thoughts I have expressed above. Therefore unless I hear from you to the contrary, I shall bring the matter up before the IAC at its meeting, Thursday, 15 January 1953.

Sincerely,

/s/ Walter B. Smith

Walter B. Smith  
Director

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22 January 1953



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28 January 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

LIKELIHOOD OF LOSS OF IMPORTANT  
ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF THE FAR EAST (NIE 56)

1. All IAC agencies have concurred in the recommendation of the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (IAC-D-62).
2. NIE 56 is hereby cancelled.

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

LIKELIHOOD OF LOSS OF IMPORTANT  
ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF THE FAR EAST (NIE 56)

1. There is attached hereto a recommendation of the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, that NIE 56 be cancelled.

2. CIA concurs in this recommendation. The Economic Intelligence Committee stated that the studies which that Committee has been preparing as contributions to the NIE 56 series will be continued and will be published as completed studies.

25X1A 3. The members of the IAC are requested to inform this Office, [redacted] of their concurrence or non-concurrence by the close of business 21 January 1953.

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